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Is Stock a Security? A Criticism of the 
Sale of Business Doctrine in Securities 
Fraud Litigation 
INTRODUCTION 
Notwithstanding the statutory definitions of a security,' all of which 
'Assistant Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; B.A. 1970, Barnard 
College; J.D. 1973, Columbia University. 
The term "security" is defined in 5 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities 
Act) as: 
[Alny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebted- 
ness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree- 
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate 
of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other 
mineral rights, or, in general, any instrument commonly known as a "se- 
curity," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or in- 
terim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing. 
15 U.S.C. 5 77b(l) (1976). "Security" is defined in 5 3(a)(10) of the Securities Ex- 
change Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) as: 
[Alny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other 
mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization 
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contra&, voting- 
trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any 
instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest 
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or 
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but 
shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's 
acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding 
ninimonths, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the matur- 
ity of which is likewise limited. 
15 U.S.C. 5 78c(a)(10) (1976). Both definitions are preceded by the introductory 
phrase, "unless the context otherwise requires." 
Despite differences in the statutory language, it is accepted that the provisions should 
be construed equivalently. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967). 
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expressly include stock, a majority of the courts recently considering the 
question have held that, in many instances, the sale of shares in closely 
held corporations2 is not a sale of securities for the purpose of asserting 
private claims under the federal securities laws.' Both federal and state 
Thirty-four states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have adopted substan- 
tially the Uniform Securities Act. The Act defines a "security" as: 
[Alny note; stock; treasury stock; bond; debenture; evidence of indebted- 
ness; certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree- 
ment; collateral-trust certificate; preorganization certificate or subscription; 
transferable share; investment contract; voting-trust certificate; certificate 
of deposit for a security; certificate of interest or participation in an oil, 
gas, or mining title or lease or in payments out of production under such a 
title or lease; or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known 
as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary 
or interim certificate for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to 
or purchase, any of the foregoing. "Security" does not include any insur- 
ance or endowment policy or annuity contract under which an insurance 
company promises to pay a fixed number of dollars either in a lump sum 
or periodically for life or for some other specified period. 
UNIF. SEC. ACT 8 401(1), 7A U.L.A. 628 (1978). 
There has been considerable cross-pollination between the state and the federal defi- 
nitions both in drafting the statutes and in interpreting them. Id., Commissioners' note 
at 631. 
Closely held, or close, or closed corporations, often referred to as incorporated part- 
nerships, have no precise definition. For a legislative attempt, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, 5 342 (1974). The principal characteristics of close corporations are generally 
thought to include: a small number of stockholders, no ready market for the stock, and 
substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction, and opera- 
tions of the corporation. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 
586, 328 N.E.2d 505, 51 1 (1975). 
' The principal federal regulatory provisions are 4 5 of the Securities Act, requiring 
registration of securities offered to the public, 5 17(a) of the Securities Act, prohibiting 
fraud in the offer and sale of securities, and 5 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 
lob-5 thereunder, prohibiting fraud in the purchase and sale of securities. 
Typically, initial issuances of securities in closely held corporations would be exempt 
from the 5 5 registration requirements as "transactions by an issuer not involving any 
public offering," under 15 U.S.C. 5 77d(2) (1976). Subsequent transfers would be ex- 
empt from registration as transactions not involving an underwriter, pursuant to 15 
U.S.C. 5 77d(l) (1976). But see Swenson v. Engelstad, 626 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(sale of hockey team's stock to its coach and his wife not exempt from registration); 
Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978) (sale of two unique notes to one 
investor not exempt from registration). Securities transactions which are exempt from 
registration under Securities Act, 5 4, 15 U.S.C. 5 77d (1976), are not exempted from 
the antifraud provisions of either the Securities or the Exchange Act. Securities Act, 5 I 
17(a), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (1976); Exchange Act, 5 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 4 78j(b) (1976). 
Thus, subject matter jurisdiction to consider claims under those provisions does not 
depend on registration but does depend, inter alia, on whether the transaction involves 
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the offer, purchase, or sale of a security. 
Section 10(b) of the Exchanae Act states that: 
. . - 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
anv means or instrumentalit~ of interstate commerce or of the mails. or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange . . . . T o  use or employ, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipu- 
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. 9 78j(b) (1976). Rule lob-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in 1942, states that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) T o  employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) T o  make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessarv in order to make the statements made. in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) T o  engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any persons, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. 8 240.10b-5 (1982). Federal courts have consistently implied a private cause 
of action under Rule lob-5, beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. 
Supp. 512 (E.D.' Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court first acknowledged existence of a 
private claim in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act states that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities 
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communi- 
cation in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indi- 
rectly - 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances Lnder which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 
15 U.S.C. 9 77q(a) (1976). The Supreme Court has not decided whether there is a 
private right of action implied under 5 17(a). The circuit courts of appeals are split on 
this issue. The most recent and comprehensive analysis is found -in Landry v .  All 
American Assur. Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982). The Fifth Circuit held, based on 
Supreme Court precedent, that no private claim should be implied. The court acknowl- 
edged that its holding was a minority view, but noted that few courts had analyzed the 
issue in depth. Accord Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 159 (8th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). Contra Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers 
11, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 1981); Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Heber, 604 F.2d 
1038, 1039 (7th Cir. 1979); Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 
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courts4 have so concluded, principally based on their analysis of the 
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 98 (4th Cir. 
1975) (private right of action exists). See generally Scholl & Perkowski, An Implied 
Right of Action Under Section 17(a): The Supreme Court Has Said "No," But Is 
Anybody Listening?, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 41 (1981). 
While it appears unlikely that the Supreme Court will infer additional private rights 
of action from the texts of the securities laws, see note 10 and accomanying text infra, 
most complaints which include a $ 17(a) claim also state a Rule 10b-5 claim and the 
issue therefore is largely academic. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 4&1 F.2d 833, 867 
(2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Many 
courts, finding that the plaintiff has a claim under Rule 10b-5, do not reach the ques- 
tion of an implied remedy under $ 17(a). See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. 
National Student Mktg., Inc., 650 F.2d 342, 350 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
, 452 U.S. 954 (1981). 
The Supreme Court recently decided that an implied remedy exists under Rule lob- 
5 for purchasers who have an express remedy under $ 11 of the Securities Act, 15 
U.S.C. $ 77k (1976), because the purchased securities were issued pursuant to a regis- 
tration statement filed under $ 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 77e (1976). Herman 
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983). 
State securities regulatory schemes vary. As of 1976, 45 jurisdictions required regis- 
tration of securities or required selling broker-dealers to file information on securities. 
See generally L. LOSS, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 39 (1976). 
For the variety of antifraud provisions, see id. at 6-8. Discussion of the effect of the sale 
of business doctrine on state securities laws is outside the scope of this Article. 
' Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982), discussed in notes 61-65 and ac- 
companying text infra; Kaye v. Pawnee Constr. Co., 680 F.2d 1360 ( l l th  Cir. 1982); 
King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 ( l l th  Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 
F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981), discussed in notes 51-58 and accompanying text infra; 
Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977); Goodman v. DeAzoulay, No. 
81-2550 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Fedsec library, Courts file); 
C.P. Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., No. 80-C-2476 (N.D. 111. Dec. 15, 1982;) (available 
on LEXIS, Fedsec library, Courts file); Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 534 F. 
Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 696 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1982); Kane v. Fischbach, [Cur- 
rent Developments] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) fl 98,608 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1982); 
Kasch Enter. v. Soren, No. 79-C-2661 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 1981) (available on LEXIS, 
Fedsec library, Courts file); Libco Corp. v. Dusek, No. 7742-4386 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 
1981) (available on LEXIS, Fedsec library, Courts file); Reprosystem v. SCM Corp., 
522 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State 
Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Zilker v. Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ill. 
1981); Anchor-Darling Indus. v. Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Barsy v. 
Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Ellis v. Henderson, [I980 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) fl 97,722 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 24, 1980); Dueker v. Turner, 
[1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) fl 97,386 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 
1979); Bula v. Mansfield, [I979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,964 
(D. Colo. May 13, 1977); Howard v. Chrysler Corp., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) fl 98,306 (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 1977); Fox v. Ehrmantraut, 28 Cal. 
3d 127, 615 P.2d 1383, 167 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1980); Tech Resources, Inc. v. Estate of 
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United States Supreme Court's decision in United Housing Founda- 
tion, Inc. v. Forman.* 
The conclusion that stock is not a security not only ignores the literal 
meaning of the federal securities statutes, but also marks a drastic de- 
parture from the views generally accepted prior to Forman. Until For- 
man it was well established that transfers of stock in closely held corpo- 
rations were transactions involving securities and, as such, were subject 
to federal securities lawse6 Indeed, Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,' 
the first case to imply a private cause of action under Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule lob-5 of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), involved the buyout of 
a fifty percent shareholder group in a close corporation by the other 
fifty percent shareholder group. 
Courts occasionally expressed discomfort with this view,' but it was 
not until the Seventh Circuit's 1981 decision in Frederiksen v. 
Poloway9 that it became widely accepted that transfers of stock in 
Hubbard, 246 Ga. 583, 272 S.E.2d 314 (1980); Kaiser v. Olson, 105 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 
435 N.E.2d 113 (1982). 1 
Other courts have either rejected the sale of business doctrine outright or questioned 
its validity. See Cole v. PPG Indus., 680 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Arkansas 
law); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982), discussed in notes 66-77 and 
accompanying text infra; Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979), discussed in notes 78-83 and accompanying text 
infra; Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 
1974) (pre-Forman); Stacey v. Charles J. Rogers, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Mich. 
1982); Sterling Recreation 01-g. v. Segal, 537 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Colo. 1982); Alna 
Capital Assocs., Inc. v. Wagner, 532 F. Supp. 591 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Mifflin Energy 
Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Titsch Printing, Inc. v. 
Hastings, 456 F. Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 
(E.D. Pa. 1976). 
421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
* See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960): mrt. denied, 365 
U.S. 870 (1961); Errion v. Carroll, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Fratt v. Robinson, 
203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953). 
' 69 F. Supp 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
See, e.g., Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 35 n.3 (3d Cir. 1979) (although not 
wholly persuaded that regulation of close corporations was intended by Congress, court 
felt bound by literal reading of statute and governing precedent); Chiodo v. General 
Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860, 863-64 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004 
(1967) (court questioned application of securities laws to sale of business, but dismissed 
case because of expired statute of limitations); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 320 F. 
Supp. 539, 543-44 (N.D. 111. 1970) (court considered sale of bushess doctrine, but 
rejected it); see also 1 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 458-60 (1961); 4 L. LOSS, 
SECURITIES REGULATION 2489-91 (1969). 
637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). The widespread 
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closely held corporations were, under the sale of business doctrine, not 
subject to federal securities laws. 
The issue of whether stock is a security typically involves the sale of 
all the corporate stock of an active, closely held business to an individ- 
ual or corporation that takes over the operation of the business. The 
disappointed purchaser may subsequently bring an action under Sec- 
tion 10(b) and Rule lob-5 of the Exchange Act, alleging fraudulent 
statements or omissions in connection with the sale of the stock. Courts 
that have adopted the sale of business doctrine have reasoned that, since 
the plaintiff purchased an ongoing business and took over its operation, 
the transaction did not involve an investment decision and was not a 
securities transaction. The purchasers' suits are thus dismissed for lack 
of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Lower federal courts apparently 
are striving to expand upon the Supreme Court's dual policies of deny- 
ing relief to many securities plaintiffs" and, toward that end, of devis- 
acceptance of the sale of business doctrine is discussed in part I1 infra. 
Commentary generally approves of the sale of business doctrine. See Seldin, When 
Stock is Not a Security: The 'Sale o f  Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities 
Laws, 37 BUS. LAW. 637 (1982); Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Security: 
Why Purchasing All of  a Company's Stock is Not a Federal Securities Transaction, 57 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 225 (1982); Note, Acquisition of Businesses Through Purchase of 
Corporate Stock; An Argument for Exclusion from Federal Securities Regulations, 8 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 295 (1980); Note, Securities Regulation - Is Stock a Security?, 
30 KAN. L. REV. 117 (1981); Comment, The Sale o f  a Close Corporation Through a 
Stock Transfer: Covered by the Federal Securities Laws?, 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 
749 (1981). But see Dillport, Restoring Balance to the Definition of Security, 10 SEC. 
REG. L.J. 99 (1982). 
Mr. Seldin approves of the doctrine because it enhances the attractiveness of a stock 
transaction by providing relief from the burdens of federal securities regulation. Seldin, 
supra, at 637. Professor Thompson argues that there are distinctions between state and 
federal fraud and that Congress intended the securities laws to reach only those trans- 
actions in need of special federal protection. Federal protection is needed only when the 
purchaser becomes a passive investor in an enterprise. Thompson, supra, at 242-44. In 
contrast, Professor Dillport asserts that Congress deliberately drafted an overinclusive 
definition of security to provide protection against fraud. Dillport, supra, at 122-28. 
'O The Supreme Court's effort to reduce the number of securities cases in federal 
courts is manifested by decisions in three substantive areas of securities law. First, the 
Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of federal securities jurisdiction by finding that 
certain types of instruments, e.g., stock in housing cooperatives, employees' pension 
plans, certificates of deposit in federally regulated banks, are not "securities." See notes 
20-37 and accompanying text infra. Second, the Court has narrowed the reach of Rule 
lob-5 by holding that: (a) the plaintiff must be a purchaser or a seller of securities, 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); (b) the defendant must 
have acted with scienter, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); (c) the 
misconduct must involve deception or manipulation, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 
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ing rules to weed out at early stages of litigation, plaintiffs who do not 
assert what the courts feel sure will turn out to be meritorious Rule 
lob-5 claims. 
This Article criticizes the use of the sale of business doctrine in se- 
curities fraud litigation. The Article first discusses the Supreme Court's 
efforts at defining a security, from its early investment contract analysis 
in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.," to Forman and other recent opinions. 
Part I1 analyzes the leading federal cases on the sale of business doc- 
trine and examines problems in applying the doctrine. Next, pan  I11 
examines alternative bases, within established Rule lob-5 jurispru- 
dence, for dismissing the claims of purchasers of stock in close corpora- 
tions. Finally, the Article asserts that, because the sale of business doc- 
trine is inconsistent with congressional intent and is an improper 
solution to problems that exist in Rule lob-5 practice, it should be re- 
430 U.S. 462 (1977); and (d) when the alleged misconduct involves nondisclosure, the 
defendant must have had a duty to disclose, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 
(1980). Third, the Court has reduced the number of private suits that can be brought 
by refusing to imply additional private causes of action. Compare Superintendent of 
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 
377 U.S. 426 (1964), with Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 
444 U.S. 11 (1979), Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), and Piper 
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). 
In narrowing the scope of Rule lob-5, the Court has relied on the following policy 
considerations: 
1. "[Llitigation under Rule lob-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree 
and in kind from that which accompanies Litigation in general." Blue Chip Stamps, 421 
U.S. at 739. This may give even the flimsiest case a substantial settlement value. Id. at 
740. 
2. The Court is reluctant to create a federal claim when it is "unnecessary to ensure the 
fulfillment of Congress' purposes," Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 477; when it would 
serve "at best a subsidiary purpose" of the federal legislation, id. at 478, or when the 
cause of action is one "traditionally relegated to state law . . . ." M. "Absent a clear 
indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion 
of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where 
established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden." Id. at 479. Fi- 
nally, in the area of implying federal causes of action under the securities laws, the 
Court has moved away from its early willingness to imply.causes of action, to an un- 
willingness to do so without arguably clear congressional intent to create a private fed- 
eral claim. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 
U.S. 11, 24 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979). For a 
recent and rare implication of a private remedy in a federal statutory scheme, see Mer- 
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982) (private party 
may maintain action for damages caused by violation of Commodity Exchange Act). 
See generally Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553 (1981). 
" 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
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jected by the courts. 
I. T H E  SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: INVESTMENT CONTRACTS AND 
ECONOMIC REALITIES 
The United States Supreme Court has analyzed the definition of a 
security eight times since 1943.12 In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,13 the 
Court enunciated the investment contract test for defining a security. It 
used the statutory phrase "investment contract" to expand the defini- 
tion of security to include unconventional instruments not within the 
traditional types of securities expressly enumerated in the Securities Act 
of 1933 (Securities Act) or the Exchange Act. In United Housing 
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman," the Court emphasized that "economic 
realities" must be examined and applied in connection with the Howey 
investment contract test, and narrowed the definition of security to ex- 
clude an instrument denominated stock, notwithstanding the express in- 
clusion of stock in the statutory definitions. The Court has continued to 
constrict the definition in its most recent decisions in this area, Interna- 
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. DanielI5 and Marine Bank v. 
Wea ver. l6 
A. SEC v. Howey: The Investment Contract Test 
In Howey, the SEC sought to enjoin defendants from offering and 
selling unregistered securities in violation of Section 5 of the Securities 
Act." Defendants offered vacationers in Florida a strip of a citrus grove 
along with a service contract for the cultivation and marketing of the 
fruit. The district court found, and the appeals court agreed, that there 
was no security involved, because the purchase of land and the arrange- 
ment of services were two separate transactions. 
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that these transactions consti- 
tuted an "investment contract," one form of security in the Securities 
'' Chronologically, the eight cases are: SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 
344 (1943); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Variable Annuity 
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 
(1967); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. 
Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 
551 (1979); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). 
I' 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
I' 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
l5 439 U.S. 551 (1979). 
" 455 U.S. 551 (1982). 
I' 15 U.S.C. 5 77e(c) (1976); see note 3 supra. 
Heinonline - -  16 U . C .  Davis L. Rev. 332 1982-1983 
19831 Sale o f  Business Doctrine 333 
Act. The Court noted that the purchasers were vacationing business 
and professional people who were told that investment in a grove was 
not feasible unless service arrangements were made. The service con- 
tract had a binding term of ten years and gave the owners no right to 
enter their land to pick fruit without the company's consent. In addi- 
tion, the owners had no right to specific fruit, and were entitled only to 
allocable portions of the net profits from the entire grove." The Court 
focused on the sales pitch and the audience at which it was directed, 
and found that an investment contract existed because the plan consti- 
tuted "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his 
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from 
the efforts of the promoter or third party."19 
B. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman: The Economic 
Realities Approach 
Plaintiffs in Forman lived in a state subsidized, nonprofit housing 
cooperative. They brought a class and derivative action against the de- 
velopers of the cooperative and others, alleging violations of Section 
17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 of the 
Exchange Act. The Supreme Court held that shares of stock which en- 
titled the purchaser to lease an apartment in the cooperative were not 
securities. The Court rejected the view that, because the shares were 
labelled stock, they must be considered securities because the statutory 
definition includes "any stock."20 Instead, the Court determined that 
Congress intended not a literal approa~h,~'  but an examination of the 
"economic reali t ie~."~~ The Court did suggest that the literal approach 
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 296 (1946). 
Id. at 299. 
lo  SCe note'i supra. 
" The Court stated: 
The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate 
serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market. The focus of the 
Acts is on the capital market of the enterprise system: the sale of securities 
to raise capital for profit-making purpos&, the exchanges on which securi- 
ties are traded, and the need for regulation to p m n t  fraud and to protect 
the interests of investors. Because securities tdsactions are economic. in 
character Congress intended the application of the& statutes to turn on the 
economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended 
thereto. 
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). 
" The "economic realities" approach was not new, as the Court noted. It originated 
in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), the first Supreme Court 
opinion to consider the definitional issue, and runs through SEC v. W.J. Howey Ca., 
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might be appropriate in certain cases to prevent disappointment of a 
purchaser's reasonable expectation that the federal securities laws were 
applicable: 
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not dispositive, we 
do not suggest that the name is wholly irrelevant to the decision whether it 
is a security. There may be occasions when the use of a traditional name 
such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume 
that the federal securities laws apply. This would clearly be the case when 
the underlying transaction embodies some of the significant characteristics 
typically associated with the named instrument." 
The Court believed, however, that the purchasers of the cooperative's 
stock could not have been so misled. First, they were purchasing stock 
to acquire a place to live; second, their stock lacked the characteristics 
traditionally associated with stock, such as the right to dividends, the 
right to vote, negotiability, the ability to be pledged or hypothecated, 
and the potential for appreciation in value.24 
The Court also held that the shares were not securities included 
within the catch-all statutory language, "in general, any interest or in- 
strument commonly known as a 'security.' v5 The Court stated that the 
Howey investment contract testz6 "embodies the essential attributes that 
run through all of the Court's decisions defining a ~ecurity."~' 
328 U.S. 293 (1946), and Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967). Joiner and 
Tcherepnin, however, both strongly suggest that the economic realities approach should 
not exclude from the definition of securities instruments explicitly enumerated as secur- 
ities in the statute. Thus, in Joiner, the Court stated that "[i]nstruments may be in- 
cluded within any of these definitions, as [a] matter of law, if on their face they answer 
to the name or description." 320 U.S. at 351. The Court's approach remained consis- 
tent with that view in Tcherepnin, in which it said that an instrument denominated a 
stock certificate would be deemed a security at least so long as profits are distributable 
through dividends, 389 U.S. at 339. In Forman, on the other hand, the Court dismissed 
the above language as dicta and emphasized the theme of economic realities found in 
Howey, 328 U.S. at 298, and in Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336. United Hous. Found., 
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849-50 (1975). 
23 421 U.S. at 850-51. 
" Id. at 851. 
25 See note 1 supra. 
26 See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra. 
2' United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). In contrast, the 
Court in Tcherepnin gave independent consideration and weight to each of the defini- 
tional terms used in the statute. The Court thus believed that the withdrawable savings 
and loan association capital shares could be considered as any one of the following: 
investment contract, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree- 
ment, stock, or transferable share. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 336, 339 (1967). 
Heinonline - -  16 U . C .  Davis L. Rev. 334 1982-1983 
Sale of Business Doctrine 
C. Post-Forman Opinions 
Two Supreme Court opinions after Forman have likewise declined to 
view the definition of a security expansively. In International Brother- 
hood of Teamsters v. DanielYz8 the Court held that an employee's inter- 
est in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan was not a security 
for two reasons. First, the Court reiterated its earlier language narrow- 
ing the scope of Rule lob-5: "The starting point in every case involving 
construction of a statute is the language itself,"19 and noted that the 
definitions of security in both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act 
did not specifically include employee pension plans, despite their wide- 
spread use at the time the statutes were enacted.'O The Court then fo- 
cused on the Howey/Forman investment contract/economic realities 
test and found that there was no investment of money in a common 
enterprise and no expectation of profits from the efforts of others." 
2' 439 U.S. 551 (1979). 
I' International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979). This sen- 
tence has appeared in Santa Fe Indus., Inc, v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975). 
'O International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979). In Interpre- 
tative Release No. 33-6188, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 1051 (Feb. 1, 1980) the 
SEC staff analyzed Daniel and determined that employee benefit plans which were 
both voluntary and contributory for participating employees were subject to the regis- 
tration requirements and the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act. Registration, 
however, would in most instances be required, under the staffs interpretation of the 
Securities Act's Q 3(a)(2) exemption, 15 U.S.C. Q 77c(a)(2) (1976), only when the plan 
invests in the employer's own securities in an amount greater than that contributed to 
the plan by the employer. In Interpretative Release No. 33-6281, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. 
7 1052 (Jan. 15, 1981), the staff confirmed this view. Notwithstanding the SEC's view, 
lower courts have extended the Daniel rationale to exclude interests in voluntary and 
contributory plans from the definition of securities. Coward v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 
686 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982); Cunha v. Ward Foods, Inc., 545'F. Supp. 94 (D. 
Hawaii 1982); O'Neil v. Marriott Corp., 538 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Md. 1982); Tanuggi 
v. Grolier, Inc. 471 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Newkirk v. General Elec. Co., 
[1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,216 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 
1979). 
" The plaintiff in Daniel had argued that part of his total employment compensa- 
tion was invested in the fund. The Court found this insufficient to meet the Howey 
investment-of-money test. What Howey contemplated was a "specific consideration" 
given up in exchange for an interest that had the characteristics of a security. In con- 
trast, the purported investment in Daniel was a relatively insignificant part of the em- 
ployee's total and indivisible compensation package. Applying Forman's "economic re- 
alities," it was clear to the Court that plaintiff was working to earn his living, not to 
make an investment in the future. 439 U.S. at 560. Plaintiff also argued that he ex- 
pected to receive profits upon retirement from the plan managers' skill in investing the 
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While the principal basis for the Daniel holding was thus a ringing 
affirmation of Forrnan's economic realities test, the Court in Daniel 
nevertheless employed two inconsistent methods of interpreting the stat- 
utory definition. The Court first examined the language of the statute 
and found that pension plans were not explicitly included. But then, 
quoting from Howey, it stated that the substance, or economic realities, 
of the transaction outweighed the import of the names given to the 
instruments. 
In Marine Bank v. Weaver,32 the latest Supreme Court opinion on 
the definitional issue, plaintiffs purchased a certificate of deposit from 
defendant bank and subsequently pledged it to the bank to guarantee a 
loan made by the bank to a third party. The borrowers in turn agreed 
to give plaintiffs fifty percent of their business' net profits. The borrow- 
ers went bankrupt, and plaintiffs sued the bank under Section 10(b) 
and Rule lob-5. The Court held that neither the conventional certifi- 
cate of deposit from a federally regulated bank nor the agreement 
which gave plaintiffs fifty percent of the net profits of the borrowers' 
business was a security. 
The Court found that the certificate of deposit was not a security 
principally because it was issued by a federally regulated bank.33 The 
plaintiffs assumed virtually no risk of nonpayment, unlike holders of 
other forms of long-term debt instruments. Accordingly, the Court con- 
cluded, there is no need to include transactions involving these instru- 
fund's assets. This argument failed on two grounds. First, under the Court's view, 
plaintiffs concept of "profit" was faulty, since it was based on his assertion that he had 
in fact contributed part of his compensation to the fund, with his ultimate receipt of 
more than he gave representing profit. The Court found that plaintiff made no identifi- 
able contribution. Second, the Court found that the fund's dependence on earnings from 
its assets was not substantial because the bulk of the fund's income came from the 
participating employers' contributions. Accordingly, plaintiffs expectation of profits 
rested not on the managers' investment acumen, but on the continued increase in em- 
ployers' contributions, over which the fund managers had no control. In this regard, the 
Court noted that the biggest risk to plaintiffs receipt of the benefits was not the fund's 
mismanagement of its assets, but his own inability to meet the fund's eligibility require- 
ments. 439 U.S. at 562. 
j2 455 U.S. 551 (1982). 
" The Court made reference to its decision in Daniel and to the extensive federal 
regulation of pension plans by ERISA. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558 n.7. 
The Court distinguished the certificate of deposit from the withdrawable capital shares 
of a savings and loan association found to be securities in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 
U.S. 332 (1967). Because holders of the latter instruments received dividends based on 
the association's profits and had voting rights, the withdrawable capital shares were 
much more like "the ordinary concept of a security" than was the certificate of deposit. 
455 U.S. at 557. 
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ments within the scope of transactions subject to securities regulation. 
The Court's analysis of the agreement between the plaintiffs and the 
borrowers is more significant. The Third Circuit had emphasized that 
the agreement gave the plaintiffs a share of the profits in the borrowers' 
business and therefore embodied the elements of the classic Howey in- 
vestment contract.)' Without analyzing whether the Howey test had in 
fact been .satisfied,'' the Court determined that the profit-sharing ar- 
rangement was not sufficient to make the agreement a security. The 
agreement was not within the "ordinary concept of ~ecurity")~ because 
there were no offers made to a number of potential investors, and no 
instruments were created that could have been valued by the market- 
place and traded publicly.)' Instead, the agreement was a privately ne- 
gotiated transaction, with unique features that made it an inappropri- 
ate instrument for trading. Accordingly, the Court found that it was not 
a security. 
D. Conclusion and Forecast 
Apparently, the Court is looking for one test to determine what is a 
security. Thus far, the Court's emphasis has been on the investment 
contract test of H ~ w e y . ) ~  It is equally apparent, however, that develop- 
ing a single test has proved elusi~e. '~ The Howey test presents difficul- 
ties;. Forman and Daniel make that clear. The failing of the Howey 
'' Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551 
(1982). 
" The Court did, however, note that "the provision that the Weavers [plaintiffs] 
could veto further loans gave them a measure of control over the operation of the [busi- 
ness] not characteristic of a security." Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 560. Many 
senior securities give the holder such forms of negative control over the issuer; yet their 
status as securities for purposes of federal securities regulation has not been questioned. 
3b Id. 
" In Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), the Court stated that the ability to 
be traded in a marketplace is not a critical factor in determining the existence of a 
security. 389 U.S. at 343, 345. In Weaver, however, the Court emphasized the unique 
nature of the agreement, the private negotiations, and the agreement's inability to be 
traded. publicly in finding that the profit-sharing agreement was not a security. 455 
U.S. at 560. There is, of course, a distinction between the withdrawable capital share 
in Tcherepnin and the agreement in Weaver. In the former, it was certainly possible 
for a trading market to exist; indeed, such shares apparently were traded for a brief 
time on a regional stock exchange. 389 U.S. at 345 n.34. In Weaver, on the other hand, 
it is hard to imagine this sort of profit-splitting agreement being traded publicly. 
" See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra. 
" See Schneider, The Elusive Definition of a "Security," 14 REV. SEC. REG. 981 
(1981). 
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investment contract test, in the view of the Court, is that it is poten- 
tially too inclusive.40 Thus, the Court melded to it the economic realities 
approach of Forman and Weaver, which may be stated as, "in view of 
the economic realities, does it look, feel or smell like a security?'' 
Forman and Weaver set forth various factors of economic reality to 
be considered. First, securities generally have certain characteristics 
such as the ability to be negotiated, pledged, or hypothecated, and carry 
certain accoutrements, such as the rights to vote and receive dividends." 
Second, securities can be traded in the marketpla~e,~' and a correlative 
factor is the market's ability to fix an objectively ascertainable value to 
the in~trument.~' Third, if there is no other regulatory scheme that 
more appropriately provides coverage for transactions involving this in- 
~trurnent,'~ then the instrument is more likely to be a security. 
The Court, however, may not be entirely comfortable with its prag- 
matic approach, which would eliminate from the definitional sections of 
'O Ironically, many commentators have criticized the Howey test as being too nar- 
row. See, e.g., Carney & Fraser, Defining a "Security": Georgia's Struggle with the 
"Risk Capital" Test, 30 EMORY L.J. 73 (1981); ColTey, The Economic Realities of a 
"Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367 
(1967); Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defin- 
ing Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L. J. 219 (1974); Long, An Attempt to Return 
"Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 
135 (1971). Some state courts have adopted a "risk capital" test to remedy one signifi- 
cant limitation of the investment contract approach: the requirement of profits. The 
classic exposition of the risk capital theory is Justice Traynor's opinion in Silver Hills 
Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961), in 
which the sale of memberships to finance construction of a country club to be run for 
profit was found to contravene California's securities law. In analyzing the statute, 
Justice Traynor noted that its definition included noninterest bearing debt instruments 
and concluded that: 
Since the act does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test of 
what is a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is to afford 
those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objec- 
tives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their 
capital in one form or another. 
Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89. The Supreme Court has not 
passed on the question of whether the risk capital test is to be used in federal courts, 
United Hous. Found:, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857 11.24 (1975). See Comment, 
The Federal Definition of a Security-An Examination of the "Inve$tment Contract" 
Concept and the Pmpriety of a Risk Capital Analysis Under Federal Law, 12 TEA. 
TECH. L. REV. 911 (1981). 
" United Hous. Found., Inc. v .  Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975). 
'= Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1982). 
" Id. 
" Id. n.7. 
Heinonline - -  16 U . C .  Davis L. Rev. 338 1982-1983 
19831 Sale of Business Doctrine 339 
the statutes all words other than "investment contract." While the 
Court made clear in both Forman and Weaver that finding an instru- 
ment to be a security is not mandated merely by its inclusion among 
those expressly denominated securities in the Acts, the Court began its 
analysis in Daniel by noting that pension plans were not included in 
the statutory definition. In addition, strict adherence to a pragmatic ap- 
proach here contrasts sharply with the Court's approach in other areas 
of securities law, in which the Court has significantly reduced the scope 
of regulation by substantial reliance on legislative intent as divined 
from the statutory lang~age. '~  
Looking only at these opinions, can one forecast the Court's response 
to the sale of business doctrine enunciated in Frederiksen v. Poloway? 
Under Howey, it is clear that stock held by the manager of the busi- 
ness, typically the sole shareholder in a close corporation, does not meet 
the Howey investment contract test. There is no common enterprise 
when all the stock is held by one person46 and there is no expectation of 
'* See note 10 and and text accompanying note 30 supra. 
" Judicial examination of Howey's common enterprise requirement has arisen prin- 
cipally in cases involving pyramid schemes and discretionary trading accounts. The is- 
sue has been whether horizontal commonality is required under the Howey test or 
whether vertical commonality suffices. The  distinction can be illustrated by comparing 
an investor who buys into a mutual fund with an investor who opens a discretionary 
trading account with his broker. In the former case, the investor's contribution is pooled 
with other contributions and is jointly invested by the manager; his return is a pro rata 
share of the profits made by the manager on the pooled fund. His fortunes, therefore, 
are in common with all other investors in the mutual fund, and there is horizontal 
commonality. In the latter case, while the broker-dealer may manage numerous discre- 
tionary trading accounts, there is no commingling of the accounts. The fortunes of any 
individual investor remain separate from those of any other investor, and the common 
thread is supplied by the broker-dealer; hence vertical commonality. Compare Hirk v. 
Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977); Milnarik v. M-S Commodi- 
ties, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Wasnowic v. 
Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa., 1972), a f f d  mem., 491 F.2d 752 
(3d Cir. 1973) (requiring horizontal commonality), with SEC v. Continental Commod- 
ities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 
473 (5th Cir. 1974); Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (vertical 
commonality sufficient). 
The Ninth Circuit has held that although vertical commonality can satisfy the com- 
mon enterprise requirement, there is no common enterprise in a discretionary trading 
account unless there is some direct relation between the success or failure of the broker 
and that of the investor. Discretionary accounts therefore ordinarily will not be securi- 
ties, since the broker will profit from his commissions even though the investor's ac- 
count suffers losses. Meyer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., 
686 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1982), appeal filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1983) 
(No. 82-1195); Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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profits from the efforts of others, since the shareholder is managing the 
corporation. Thus, if the Howey test is the exclusive test, the Court 
will accept the sale of business doctrine, and hold that stock is not a 
security. 
The Forman opinion is subject to two interpretations. On one hand, 
Forman supports a distinction between an interest in a corporation 
formed to engage in business, the most traditional form of stock, and 
shares in a housing cooperative, which are more commonly viewed as 
interests in real property. Moreover, corporate stock generally has all of 
the traditional characteristics associated with stock." Accordingly, then, 
one might conclude that Forman dictates no further scrutiny and that 
only corporate stock is a security. On the other hand, Forman also 
seemed to say that the investment contract analysis is the exclusive test, 
and that even if corporate stock is commonly known as a security, it is 
not a security unless it meets the Howey investment contract test.48 
Daniel and Weaver support the view that stock in close corporations 
is a security. First, Daniel reintroduced examination of the statutory 
language. Second, Daniel and Weaver emphasized the existence of a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme for the instruments involved in those 
cases; there is no comparable federal regulation for transactions in stock 
in closely held corporations. Third, Weaver's emphasis on the ordinary 
concept of a security would also seem to militate against acceptance of 
the sale of business doctrine. Stock in closely held corporations does not 
present the obstacles to public trading posed by the profit-sharing 
agreement in Weaver. As one commentator has stated, such stock is 
"waiting in the wings of the  market^":'^ the manager of the corporation 
can, at any time, make a public offering of his stock to bring in passive 
investors and create a public trading market for the stock. Thus, under 
Daniel and Weaver the Court might reject the sale of business doctrine. 
Finally, if the Court has the ideal of a unitary test, the sale of busi- 
ness doctrine would be repugnant to that ideal. This is because it neces- 
" Shareholders in close corporations often restrict by contract the right to trade and 
pledge their stock. Many close corporations also do not pay dividends on their common 
stock, but distribute cash to their shareholders as salaries. This is because dividends 
must be paid from the corporation's after-tax dollars and are taxed once again when 
received by shareholders, whereas salaries are deductible from the corporation's income 
and are taxed only once, when received by the employee. See B. BITTKER & J. EUP 
TICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION F CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 1.03 (4th 
ed. 1979). 
" See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra. 
" FitzGibbon, What is a Security? - A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Partici- 
pate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893, 918 (1980). 
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sarily results in an instrument being a security in some transactions, 
but not in others, depending upon whether the parties intended to 
transfer control of a.closely held corporation. 
11. THE SALE OF BUSINESS DOCTRINE 
Most courts that have considered the sale of business doctrineS0 have 
adopted the broader ruling of Forman and held that stock in closely 
held corporations is not a security if the purchaser assumes control of 
the enterprise. The courts have read Forman to require application of 
the Howey investment contract test and, applying the test, have found 
that no security was involved in the transaction. Further, they have 
found that the economic realities are that the purchaser is acquiring a 
business, not investing in securities. In other words, it is a commercial 
transaction, not an investment. 
A. Frederiksen v. Poloway 
The leading case espousing the sale of business doctrine is Frederik- 
sen v. Pol~way .~ '  In Frederiksen, plaintiff purchased all the assets and 
stock of a close corporati~n.~' The seller sued in state court for breach 
'O There are also a number of r a n t  cases which do not appear to have considered 
the question. Swenson v. Engelstad, 626 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1980) involved the sale of 
65 (out of 75 outstanding) shares of a corporation owning a hockey team to the team's 
coach and his wife. The sale of business doctrine apparently was not raised by the 
parties. Although. the court could have raised the issue on its own motion because the 
issue involved its own jurisdiction to hear the case under FED. R. QV. P. 12(h)(3), it 
did not. . 
" 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), en. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). 
The Tenth Circuit had earlier adopted the sale of business doctrine in Chandler v. 
Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977), aFg (1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REP. (CCH) Q 96,965 (D. Colo. Dec. 4, 1975). The Chandler court held that the sale 
of all the stock of a corporation owning a liquor store was not a transaction involving a 
security. The agreement referred to the purchase of " 'described business and personal 
property . . . called K.E.W. Inc. .. . .' " and stated " 'PRICE T O  INCLUDE: 100% 
of the outstanding issued stock of K.E.W., . . .' " The court held that the plaintiff was, 
in substance, purchasing a liquor store and "incidentally, as an indicia of ownership," 
was receiving the stock. 691 F.2d at 444. 
" The transaction was structured as a purchase of the corporate assets for $191,800, 
to be paid as follows: $160,000 to be paid into an escrow account to be used to pay all 
existing debts of North Shore Marina, Inc. (NSM) and any unknown liabilities; the 
balance of $31,800 was to be paid in equal monthly installments over a three-year 
period beginning one year from the signing of the agreement. In addition, defendant 
Poloway, the sole shareholder of NSM, sold 10% of the NSM stock to Emerald City 
Corp. (ECC) for $10, and, for an additional $10, transferred his remaining 90% inter- 
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of contract and fraud when his employment was terminated six months 
after the sale. Defendants in the state action sued in federal court, as- 
serting federal securities violations and pendent state law claims. The 
district court dismissed the action, and the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed, on the ground that the transaction did not involve a 
security. 
The Seventh Circuit rejected the purchaser's argument for a literal 
reading of the statute, and focused on whether the transaction was pri- 
marily for commercial or for investment purposes.53 The court found 
that the sale was a commercial transaction for two reasons. First, the 
sale did not raise capital for corporate expansion, and was not, in For- 
man's language, "the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making 
 purpose^."^' Rather, the sale of stock was used to vest the purchaser 
with ownership of the business, similar to the method by which the 
purchaser in Forman obtained living quarters. Accordingly, title to the 
est to a voting trust controlled by plaintiff Frederiksen, the president of ECC. After all 
the debts of NSM were paid out of the escrow account or earlier at the option of ECC, 
NSM would pay off the balance of the funds to Poloway in redemption of his shares 
held in the voting trust. There was also an agreement that ECC would em- 
ploy Poloway for five years at an annual salary of $32,000, plus a consulting fee and a 
20% sales commission, and a management agreement between ECC and NSM, giving 
ECC management authority over the marina. 631 F.2d at 1149. 
" In Forman, the Court emphasized that the purchasers of the housing cooperative's 
stock were motivated by a desire to obtain low-cost housing, not a desire to make an 
investment, since the stock did not pay dividends and could not appreciate in value. 
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 834, 851 (1975). This same distinction 
between a commercial and an investment transaction has also been drawn in cases 
involving the question of whether notes are securities. See Exchange Nat'l Bank v. 
Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131-38 (2d Cir. 1976) for an analysis of the 
various approaches taken by federal courts on this issue. Commentary on this subject 
includes Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are Not Always Securities, 30 BUS. LAW: 763 
(1975); Lipton & Katz, "Notes"Are (Are Not?) Always Securities: A Review, 29 BUS. 
LAW. 861 (1974); Sonnenschein, Federal Securities Coverage of Note Transactions: 
The Antifraud Provisions, 35 BUS. LAW. 1567 (1980); Note, The Commercial Paper 
Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U .  CHI. L. REV. 362 (1972); Comment, Commer- 
cial Notes and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note 
is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REV. 478 (1973). The proposed Federal Securities 
Code excludes from the definition of securities notes issued in a "primarily mercantile 
or consumer, rather than investment, transaction not involving a distribution," 1 FED. 
SEC. CODE 4 202(150)(B)(iii) (1980), which the reporter says is the "least imperfect 
solution to a troublesome problem." Id. 4 202(200). 
I' United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). On this basis 
the Frederiksen court distinguished Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979), discussed in notes 78-83 and accompany- 
ing text infra. 
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stock was passed "incidentally as an indicia of ownership of the busi- 
ness assets,"55 and the transaction was not a sale of securities. 
Second, the court applied the investment contract test of Forman: 
The 'economic reality' test for determining the existence of a security in- 
volves three elements: (1) an investment in a common venture; (2) pre- 
mised on a reasonable expectation of profits; (3) to be derived from the 
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of 0thers.l" 
The court found the first element of the test absent here because 
there was no sharing or pooling of funds in a common venture." The 
court also found that defendant was no longer a participant in a joint 
venture after the transaction, notwithstanding his employment agree- 
ment to receive a sales commission and his ownership of ninety percent 
of the stock transferred to a voting trust controlled by plaintiff. More 
important, the third element of the Forman test was lacking because 
plaintiffs assumed management of the business and were not depending 
on defendant's efforts to make a profit. The court rejected the assertion 
that the employment agreement established plaintiffs' reliance on de- 
fendant's efforts, since as an employee defendant was not responsible 
for those " 'essential managerial decisions' . . . affecting the conduct of 
the bus ines~ ."~~  Indeed, the agreement specified that defendant was to 
" Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151-52 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 
1017 (1981). 
'"37 F.2d at 1152. The court attributes the test to Forrnan, but as the Forman 
court noted, the test originated in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The 
difference in language from Howey, see text accompanying note 19 supra, is because of 
the uncertainty as to whether the profits are to be derived "solely" or only "princi- 
pally" or "significantly" from the efforts of others. The Fifth Circuit in SEC v. Koscot 
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) followed the Ninth Circuit in SEC 
v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 
(1973), by permitting some degree of investor participation in a non-essential part of 
the business. The Koscut court stated, quoting from Glenn Turner, that "the critical 
inquiry is 'whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably 
significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or sumss of 
the enterprise.' " SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 483; see also SEC v. 
Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Hecht v. SEC, 
103 S. Ct. 568 (1982); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 408 n.59 (7th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 
875, 877 (10th Cir. 1975); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 
1973); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971). 
" Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1152 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 
1017 (1981), quoting Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 
1977); see note 46 and accompanying text supra. 
" Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 
1017 (1981), quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), 
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operate under the policies established by the new owner. Accordingly, 
under the investment contract analysis, there was no security here. 
B. Variations On a Theme: The Sale of  Business Doctrine in the 
Circuit Courts 
In Canfield v. Rapp & Son, I ~ c . , ~ ~  the Seventh Circuit made it clear 
that the Frederiksen holding was not limited to purchases of corporate 
assets along with stock. The court extended the doctrine to an acquisi- 
tion solely of all the corporation's stock. On the other hand, in Mc- 
Grath v. Zenith Radio Corp.,6' the Seventh Circuit distinguished 
Frederiksen. In McGrath, defendant purchased all of the stock from a 
number of shareholders, including plaintiff McGrath, a minority share- 
holder and officer of the corporation. Plaintiff alleged that defendant 
had made misrepresentations regarding plaintiffs continued employ- 
ment which induced him to sell his stock and surrender a stock option. 
The court found that plaintiff was an investor in the company and the 
stock was therefore a security in his hands; the stock did not lose its 
status as a security merely because all the holders transferred their 
stock simultaneously. 
In Sutter v. Green;' however, the Seventh Circuit reconsidered the 
sale of business doctrine and reaffirmed it.62 The court found additional 
support for the doctrine in Weaver's holding that the bank certificate of 
deposit was not a security because of the protection of the federal bank- 
ing laws.63 In the Seventh Circuit's view, the Supreme Court in Weaver 
had clearly rejected a literal approach in favor of a pragmatic 
Furthermore, the court determined that the 1934 Congress, which en- 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); see note 56 supra. 
654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981). 
" 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981). 
" 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff owned 70% of the stock of Happy Radio, 
Inc. whose principal asset was a contract to purchase all the stock of Bret Broadcasting 
Corp. from defendants over a twelve-year period and to manage Bret. Plaintiff alleged 
that defendants overstated the corporation's earnings both to induce plaintiff to pay an 
inflated price for the stock and to induce plaintiff to buy his 70% interest in Happy 
Radio. The court stated that Happy Radio's purchase of all of the Bret stock fell 
squarely within the sale of business doctrine. 
62 The court felt reconsideration was appropriate in light of Marine Bank v. 
Weaver, discussed in notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra, and Golden v. 
Garafalo, discussed in notes 66-77 and accompanying text infra. 
" Apparently, the Seventh Circuit did not find relevant Weaver's analysis of the 
profit-sharing agreement, since it did not discuss this part of the Weaver opinion. 
6' The Seventh Circuit ignored the fact that some commercial instruments, though 
"notes," have not been considered securities even by courts following a literal approach. 
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acted the Exchange Act, intended by its use of the term "investor" to 
exclude from protection the entrepreneur or the manager of a 
bu~iness.~' 
On the other hand, in Golden v. Garafa10,~~ the Second Circuit con- 
sidered and rejected the sale of business doctrine. Plaintiffs purchased a 
ticket brokerage business from its sole shareholder. The lawyers for the 
parties determined that the transaction should take the form of a sale of 
all of the stock, because the corporation's lease on the business premises 
contained a nonassignment clause. Although the stock was placed in 
escrow as security for full payment of the purchase price, the parties 
understood that the new owners had complete control over the busi- 
n e ~ s . ~ '  The court conceded that the transact-ion was squarely within the 
sale of business doctrine if the doctrine were law in the Second Cir- 
~ u i t , ~ ~  and acknowledged that the doctrine was not ~nreasonab le ,~~  but 
nevertheless rejected it. 
The court first discussed the doctrine's "inherent elusiveness as a le- 
gal concept,"'O and noted that the doctrine requires an assessment of the 
purchaser's intentions. Moreover, the court stated that problems also 
arise in determining what constitutes a controlling block of stock. The 
court also noted that the doctrine had even been extended to hold that 
publicly traded stock might not be a security in certain circumstances.71 
Publicly traded stock, of course, had been thought since passage of the 
Acts to be the quintessential security, subject not only to the antifraud 
provisions of the Acts, but also to their other regulatory provisions. The 
court felt that acceptance of the doctrine would only add to the difficul- 
ties of trial judges, requiring them to rule on subjective factual issues 
simply to determine their own jurisdiction. 
. - 
In reviewing Howey, Forman, and Weaver, the court determined 
that the Howey investment contract test was applicable only for uncon- 
'* For this assertion the court relied principally on Berle and Means' 1932 work 
T H E  MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, L'which made 'the separation of 
[passive stock] ownership and [active managerial] control' in the modern corporation 
. . . a rallying cry for reformers," and led to enactment of the federal securities laws. 
687 F.2d at 201. 
" 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982). 
'' Id. at 1147 (facts taken from dissenting opinion of Lurnbard, J.) 
6' Id. at 1142. Indeed, the Second Circuit thought the doctrine, if it were good law at . 
all, was more clearly applicable in Golden than in Frederiksen. Id. at 1145. 
69 Id. at 1 1  40. 
'O Id. at 1145. 
" Id. at 1142. 
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ventional forms of secur i t i e~ ,~~  and the court accordingly decided to fol- 
low the literal approach." Since the stock in Golden had all the con- 
ventional attributes of stock it was considered to be "stock" and 
therefore was within the definition of a security. T o  do otherwise 
would, in the court's view, conflict with the apparent congressional in- 
tent in listing such well-recognized instruments as stock, treasury stock, 
and voting trust certificates, as well as catch-all phrases like "invest- 
ment contracts" designed to cover unorthodox forms of securities. Had 
Congress intended economic realities to be the sole test, the court rea- 
soned, there would have been no purpose in specifying instruments 
with established characteristics." 
Finally, the court noted that rejection of the sale of business doctrine 
would result in "a certain overbreadth in appli~ation,"~~ whereby 
courts would hear cases involving facts beyond "Congress' core concern 
[which] was protection of the individual investor trading in public mar- 
kets for shares of firms about which information is available only 
through intermediarie~."~~ However, the court recognized that over- 
breadth would exist even if the sale of business doctrine were adopted, 
since it is present whenever persons in control of a corporation negoti- 
ate in face-to-face  transaction^.^' 
" Id. at 1143. The court's analysis might be described as facile because the Supreme 
Court precedent can be read both to support or reject the sale of business doctrine; see 
text accompanying notes 17-49 supra. 
" The Second Circuit has consistently advocated literalism, see Exchange Nat'l 
Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1976); Forman v. Com- 
munity Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub norn. United Hous. 
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
" Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982). 
l 5  Id. at 1146. 
lb Id. 
" The court stated: 
So far as the anti-fraud policies of the Acts are concerned, the possibilities 
of fraud and the ability to protect oneself through contract are the same as 
to a 'passive' investor buying 30% of a corporation's shares from a sole 
shareholder or an 'active' purchaser taking 100% and expecting to manage 
it directly. So far as curing the overbreadth of the Act is concerned, there- 
fore, the relevant distinction is between transactions in a public market for 
stock and negotiated transactions involving close corporations, whether or 
not they include transfers of control. We take it, however, that the Act was 
always understood to apply to transactions in shares of close as well as 
publicly held corporations and to negotiated as well as market sales and 
purchases of shares. . . . Forman provides us no reason to reexamine that 
understanding. If the Congress is dissatisfied with the present scope of the 
Acts, we trust it will act accordingly. 
Heinonline - -  16 U . C .  Davis L. Rev. 346 1982-1983 
19831 Sale of Business Doctrine 347 
Prior to Garafalo, the only circuit which had read Forman narrowly 
and rejected the sale of business doctrine was the Fourth Circuit, in 
Coffin v. Polishing Machines, I~c .~ '  The plaintiff purchased a one-half 
interest in defendant corporation and became an officer. Subsequently 
he discovered that the corporation's president had converted corporate 
assets to his own use, leaving the corporation insolvent. The  district 
court relied on Forman and granted defendants' motion to dismiss be- 
cause plaintiff was to contribute substantially to the management. The 
substance of the transaction was therefore the sale of a half-interest in a 
business, and not the sale of securities. 
The  Fourth Circuit reversed, reasoning that because the statutory 
definitions include stock as a security, there is a "strong p r e s ~ m p t i o n " ~ ~  
that the statutes apply when a transaction involves stock. Accordingly, 
the court stated that Formari required analysis of the Howey criteria 
only when the stock involved did not have the "significant characteris- 
tics typically associated with the named in~trument."'~ Moreover, the 
court considered it irrelevant that the transaction could have been struc- 
tured in some other form." The  Fourth circuit's holding in Coffin, 
however, may be limited because the stock was sold in order to finance 
expansion of the corporate business and, as the court noted, the trans- 
action was a classic sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making 
The  Seventh Circuit relies on this language to reconcile 
Id. at 1 146-47. 
" 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979). 
'' 596 F.2d at 1204. It seems this presumption would be rebutted upon a showing 
that the instrument denominated "stock" had none, or merely a few, of the characteris- 
t i n  of the instruments commonly considered to be stock. See Slevin v. Pedersen Assocs., 
Inc., 540 F. Supp. 437, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The court rejected the argument that the 
economic realities of an arrangement called an "investment contract" could not be ex- 
amined after the Second Circuit's opinion in Golden: "A lizard with a sign around its 
neck reading 'dog' does not change the lizard into a Labrador retriever." 
'O "Absent some showing that ordinary corporate stocks are other than what they 
appear to be, we need not consider whether an investor will derive his profit partly 
from his own efforts." Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979). 
" "The parties in. this case chose to implement their plan for joint ownership by 
means of a stock transfer rather than a partnership agreement or a sale of assets. Hav- 
ing decided to deal in stock, they brought their transactions under the provisions of the 
federal securities statutes." Id. 
" 'LThe transaction appears to be the very sort of transfer with which the federal 
securities laws are most concerned: 'the sale of securities to raise capital for profit- 
making purposes.' " Id., quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 
849 (1975). 
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Coffin with its own decisions." 
C. Problems in Application of the Doctrine 
1. Must All the Stock Be Transferred? 
Since the essence of the sale of business doctrine is economic realities, 
the courts agree that individual transactions must be examined to ascer- 
tain if a security was involved. This approach, from the point of view 
of its adherents, rejects simplistic literalism and focuses on the purpose 
of the transaction and the intentions of the par tie^.^' According to its 
critics, however, the sale of business doctrine adds complexity and un- 
certainty to an already difficult area of law.8s 
Most of the cases in which the doctrine has been applied involved the 
sale of all the stock of an ongoing business; the purchaser subsequently 
brought an action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 
lob-5, alleging fraudulent misstatements or omissions in the negotia- 
t ion~. '~  Even the proponents of the doctrine, however, acknowledge that 
a sale of all the stock is not always outside the scope of federal securi- 
ties regulation." For example, the Seventh Circuit refused to apply the 
doctrine in McGrath when the plaintiff was a minority shareholder 
who along with the other shareholders sold his stock on the basis of 
false statements made to him about his future in the business." The 
court reasoned that plaintiff was realistically an investor in the business 
and that defendant did not immunize its fraud by purchasing all the 
stock simultaneously.89 Nevertheless, had the purchaser of all the stock 
" See Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459,465 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen 
v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). 
" Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150-52 (7th Cir.), cett. denied, 451 U.S. 
1017 (1981). 
" Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1145-46 (2d Cir. 1982). 
See King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, 
Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). 
" King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 346 (11th Cir. 1982). / 
" McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.), nrt. denied, 454 U.S. 
835 (1981). 
651 F.2d at 467-68 n.5. In contrast, when plaintiff intended to be a passive inves- 
tor, but purchased a small percentage of the stock as pan of a group, some of whose 
members took over the management of the corporation, a state court found that plaintiff 
did not purchase a security. (Alternatively, the court held that plaintiffs had waived 
their claims and were estopped to assert them because of delay.) Kaiser v. Olson, 105 
Ill. App. 3d 1008, 435 N.E.2d 113 (1982). However, if there were no affiliations be- 
tween the minority shareholders and the controlling shareholders:, apart from the fact 
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in McGrath been the plaintiff, it is clear that his suit would have been 
dismissed. Thus, application of the sale of business doctrine may turn 
on which party to the transaction brings suit. 
No case to date has involved the sale of all the stock from plaintiff to 
the defendant.90 Suppose plaintiffs business depended on a contract 
from a third party, and defendant had advance knowledge that plain- 
tiffs corporation would get the contract, but told plaintiff the contrary 
and then bought the corporation's stock at a bargain price. Does 
Frederiksen require dismissal of the suitT9' Or  suppose plaintiff sold 
the business to defendant on the basis of defendant's representation that 
he would continue plaintiffs employment in the business. Should a re- 
sult'different from that in'McGrath follow? The sale of business doc- 
trine offers no clear answer to these questions. Because one may control 
a '  corporation with less than one hundred percent stock ownership, in 
some cases with less than even fifty percent, the doctrine may be appli- 
cable when plaintiff purchases less than all the stock from defendant.92 
that their stock was acquired' simultaneously, a court might find that the minority 
shareholders purchased a security and the controlling shareholders did not. The SEC 
takes the position that individuals who agree to acquire stock at the same time in a 
private placement are members of a group for the purpose of the reporting require- 
ments under § 13(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1976). 17 C.F.R. § 
240.13d-S(b) (1982); see also notes 103-13 and accompanying text infra. 
Indeed, sellers of stock in closely held corporations have been more fortunate than 
purchasers in escaping application of the ,sale of business doctrine to bar their claims. 
See McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
835 (1981); Stacey v. Charles J. Rogers, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Mich. 1982); 
Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The only case in which a 
.seller's claim, has been dismissed is Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. 111. 1981). 
The Barsy court felt.strongly that the requisite jurisdictional connection with interstate 
commerce was tenuous. Id. at 955 n.4; see notes 139-41 and accompanying text infra. 
Stacey involved the sale of stock by plaintiffs, eight shareholders in two corporations, 
back to the corporations (in effect, to the sole remaining shareholder). The shareholders 
were children of ,the dmased founder .of both corporations. The court questioned 
whether the Sixth Circuit would adopt Frederiksen v. Poloway, but felt it need not 
reach the question because the facts brought the case within the McCrath exception to 
the doctrine, see note 60 and accompanying text supra, for simultaneous sales by mi- 
nority shareholders of substantially all of the corporation's stock. Although the eight 
shareholders may have owned sufficient stock to control the corporation, the court ap- 
parently viewed them as passive investors. 542 F. Supp. at 50. 
- CL Click V. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1980) (defendant liable under Rule 
lob-5 for misrepresenting value of stock to plaintiff); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 
(5th Cir.) (defendant liable under Rule lob-5 for misrepresentations which induced 
plaintiff to sell stock at low price), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977). 
A clear example of this is Anchor-Darling Indus. v. Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 
(E.D. Pa. 1981), in which plaintiff purchased substantially all, but not all, of the stock 
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In determining the applicability of the doctrine, courts must ascertain 
whether a controlling block of stock has been transferred, and the re- 
sult, a jurisdictional holding, may differ as to sales of stock in the same 
corporation by different persons. 
Determining control in different contexts has been a difficult issue 
for securities  lawyer^.^' Control turns not only on the amount of stock 
an individual owns, but also on how the balance of the stock is held. 
One must also consider whatever arrangements, explicit or implicit, 
that may exist among the shareholders for voting the stock and manag- 
ing the business. 
In Sutter v. G r ~ e n , ~ '  the Seventh Circuit adopted a rebuttable pre- 
sumption that an owner of more than fifty percent of a corporation's 
common stock was an entrepreneur and not an investor, and therefore 
is barred by the sale of business doctrine from bringing a securities 
fraud claim. Because the owner would be able ordinarily to elect at 
least a majority of the directors, he would be able to control 'all corpo- 
of three corporations from the defendant and at the same time bought out the remain- 
ing shareholders, who were defendant's daughters and employees. The court applied 
the sale of business doctrine. 
" Under the Securities Act, public offerings of securities made by controlling persons 
require registration if they are offered or sold through channels of interstate commerce 
or the mails, Securities Act $5 2(11), 4(1), 5; 15 U.S.C. $5 77b(ll),  77d(l), 77(e) 
(1976). Public offerings made by noncontrolling persons, however, need not be regis- 
tered, Securities Act $ 4(1), 15 U.S.C. $ 77d(l) (1976). "Control" is not defined in the 
statute, but is defined by the SEC as "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to 
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,whether 
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise," 17 C.F.R. 8 
230.405(0 (1982). The House of Representatives Committee Report stated that the 
"concept of control herein involved is not a narrow one, depending upon a mathemati- 
cal formula of 51 percent of voting power, but is broadly defined to permit the provi- 
sions of the Act to become effective wherever the fact of control actually exists." H.R. 
REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1933). The SEC has consistently refused to give 
advice to anyone seeking guidance as to whether he is a "controlling person," because 
the answer involves factual questions which the staff is not in a position to resolve. SEC 
Interpretative Release No. 33-6253, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,644 (1980). 
A defendant's argument, in a criminal case, that the term "control" was unconstitu- 
tionally vague and indefinite was rejected in United States v. Wolfson, 269 F. Supp. 
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), a r d ,  405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 
(1969). See generally 2 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 770-783 (2d ed. 1961); 5 L. 
LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 2700-2708 (Supp. 1969). 
The proposed Federal Securities Code establishes a rebuttable presumption that a 
person who owns, or has the power to vote more than 25 percent of the outstanding 
voting securities (or owns more than 25 percent of total equity if the company has no 
voting securities), controls the company. 1 FED. SEC. CODE 9 202(29)(B) (1980). 
687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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rate decisions other than those requiring approval by more than a ma- 
jority vote of the shareholders. 
The owner may argue that since the degree to which someone who 
owns fifty percent or less controls the corporation does depend on the 
distribution of the remaining shares, the party asserting the sale of bus- 
iness doctrine should have to establish that the shareholder controls the 
corporation. The Sutter court, however, specifically left the issue open 
for future c~nsidera t ion.~~ 
Transfers of fifty percent ownership have engendered diverse hold- 
ings as to the applicability of the sale of business doctrine. In Coffin, 
the Fourth Circuit rejected the doctrine when plaintiff purchased one- 
half of the stock.96 In Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State 
Bank,97 a derivative action charging various acts of alleged corporate 
mismanagement, the doctrine was applied when an individual 
purchased fifty percent of the stock from another shareholder on condi- 
tion that the purchaser would resume control and management of the 
corp~ration.~' However, in the same case, when one person purchased a 
note secured by fifty percent of the stock, there was a sale of a security, 
9 5  Id. at 203. One court refused to apply the doctrine to the sale of 38% of a publicly 
traded corporation, although it appears that court may reject the doctrine altogether. 
Alna Capital Assocs., Inc. v. Wagner, 532 F. Supp. 591, 602 (S.D. Fla. 1982): "The 
Court finds that the prohibition of fraudulent securities transactions must apply to 
large purchases as well as small purchases. Moreover, the limitation of the concept of a 
s'ecurity advocated by the Defendant is contrary to common sense and normal 
expectations." 
'' Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
868 (1979). Frederiksen attempted to distinguish Coffin by pointing out that the funds 
derived from the sale of stock in Coffin were to be used for corporate expansion. 
Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 1017 
(1981). The Garafalo court, on the other hand, found that the facts in Coffin closely 
resembled the conversion of a sole proprietorship into a partnership and looked less like 
a securities transaction than the transaction in Frederiksen. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 
F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1982). 
'' 513 F. Supp  885 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
9' The court noted that in Frederiksen v. Poloway, 687 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir.), 
a&. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 {1981), the plaintiff was the person assuming control, while 
in Oakhill, the plaintiff was the corporation, but it saw no reason to distinguish 
Frederiksen on this basis: "[Tlo do so would require a determination that the same 
transaction could be deemed as involving a security as to some of the parties thereto, 
but not to others. The court declines to find that Fredriksen (sic) was intended to 
spawn such anomalous results." Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State 
Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885, 890 (N.D. Ill. 1981). In fact, as McGrath and Oakhill itself 
(see text accompanying note 99 infra) illustrate, Frederiksen leads to precisely such 
anomalous results. 
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apparently because there was no evidence that this transaction was in- 
tended to confer responsibility for day-to-day operations on the 
purchaser.99 
Finally, when all the stock was sold to a third party, a district court 
applied the doctrine to dismiss a suit by the former fifty percent holder 
against the former forty-two percent shareholder, which alleged that 
defendant had received a better price for his stock than did plaintiff.'OO 
In contrast, another district court rejected the doctrine when plaintiff, a 
one-third shareholder, sued his brother, another one-third shareholder, 
alleging that his brother induced him to sell the stock to defendant for a 
price below market value."' Although both plaintiff and defendant 
were officers and directors, defendant handled all financial matters and 
plaintiff relied on him.''' 
2. Management of the Corporation: Actual, Joint, Delegated 
The  examination of control necessarily must be concerned not only 
with percentage of stock ownership, but also with the actual manage- 
ment of the corporation. The courts consistently find that a seller who 
continues to work for,''' or signs a consulting agreement with the pur- 
chaser,'04 does not diminish the purchaser's control. This rule has been 
applied even when the former owner continues negotiations on a key 
government contract.10s These findings seem correct, since it is apparent 
that the new owners have taken over the actual operation of the busi- 
ness and are merely calling on the former owners to achieve an orderly 
transition and thus maximize the purchased goodwill. 
A closer case is Frederiksen,'06 in which the new owner appeared to 
be relying extensively on the efforts of the former owner in running the 
business. The seller in Frederiksen entered a five-year employment 
agreement to "assist, guide and give his expertise" in return for an 
99 In addition, the court found that the terms of ;the note providing for accelerated 
payment in the event Oakhill achieved a certain level of success, made the note an 
investment and not a commercial transaction. Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. 
Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885, 892 (N.D. 111. 1981). 
l o o  Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
Io1 Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
lo2  Id. at 926. 
lo' See Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981). 
lo' See Golden v. Garafa'lo, 521 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678 F.2d 1139 
(2d Cir. 1982). 
lo' See Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981). 
Io6 Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 
(1981). 
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annual salary, a consulting fee, and a twenty percent commission. The 
commission agreement was similar to a profit-sharing arrangement, 
which brought the transaction closer to the classic understanding of a 
security. Nevertheless, the court noted that the contract provided that 
the seller had to perform within "goals, guidelines, directives, policies 
and procedures" set by the purchaser. Accordingly, the purchaser con- 
trolled the busine~s.'~' 
Additional problems are created when it appears that there may be 
joint control. The best example of this is Coffin, in which there were 
two fifty percent stockholders, and one was president and the other was 
vice president. The Fourth Circuit rejected the doctrine.'08 Kane v. 
Fischbach'09 provides another illustration of possible joint control. De- 
fendant, the sole shareholder, transferred 155 of his 200 shares to a 
partnership consisting of defendant and the two plaintiffs. The plain- 
tiffs became the directors of the corporation, and one was president. 
Defendant, now a 22% percent shareholder, was executive vice presi- 
dent. The district court applied the sale of business doctrine to dismiss 
the plaintiffs' suit. 
perhaps the most difficult problems arise when the purchaser is in- 
experienced or otherwise unwilling to run the business and delegates 
control to another. His reliance on the efforts of a third party, for pur- 
poses of the Howey test,Il0 should place him within the protected class 
of a purchaser of a security. However, because he retains ultimate, al- 
beit theoretical, control by reason of his stock ownership, he may be 
within the boundaries of the sale of business doctrine. Courts have fol- 
lo' The Golden court found the holding in Frederiksen to be a questionable applica- 
tion of the sale of business doctrine. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 
1982). On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Frederiksen is strength- 
ened by the fact that the so-called essential employee was fired within a year. Frederik- 
sen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1137, 1149 (7th Cir.), Eert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). 
See also Kasch Enter. v. Soren, No. 794-2661 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 1981) (available on 
LEXIS, Fedsec library, Courts file). In Kasch, defendants, the five former shareholders 
of Globe Corporation, exchanged their Globe stock for redeemable preferred stock of 
Kasch Enterprises. One of the defendants had an employment contract which entitled 
him to a bonus of 12M% of net profits exceeding $2 million; plaintiff argued that his 
efforts were essential to the business and that he had actual operational control. The 
court refused to find an exception to the sale of business doctrine. 
lo' Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d-1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
868 (1979). 
'09 [Current Developments] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 3 98,608 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 
1982). 
"O See text accompanying note 19 supra. 
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lowed the latter rationale. In Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc.,"' 
a corporation purchased all the stock of the direct and indirect subsidi- 
aries of another corporation. The district court applied the sale of busi- 
ness doctrine even though the purchaser stated that it did not partici- 
pate in the day-to-day management but instead relied on existing 
management. In Somogyi v. Butler,"' the court said that because plain- 
tiff had the right to exercise complete control over the business, whether 
he chose to delegate management or operate it himself was irrelevant."' 
3. Publicly Traded Corporations 
Finally, although the doctrine originated in the context of closely 
"I 534 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y.), mv'd, 696 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1982). Three months 
after the district court decision in Seagrave, the Second Circuit rejected the sale of 
business doctrine in Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982), discussed in 
notes 66-77 and accompanying text supra. The S m n d  Circuit later reversed the dis- 
trict court decision in seagrave "to give the district court a fair opportunity to decide 
the issue in light of Golden . . . . " 696 F.2d at 228. 
518 F. Supp. 970 (D.N.J. 1981). The facts were one step removed from the sale 
of business doctrine since thev involved the sale of assets and eoodwill and the subse- 
" 
quent formation by the purchaser of a new corporation which received the assets from 
the purchaser. Thus, it would stretch the limits of Rule lob-5 itself to find that the 
alleged fraud was "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities. See note 3 
supra. 
"' This view is consistent with cases involving purchasers of real estate who entered 
into a management contract with the seller or a third party. The courts have refused to 
find an investment contract under the Howey test, since the purchaser retains control 
over the enterprise despite the delegation of management. see Commander's Palace 
Park Assocs. v. Girard & Pastel Corp., 572 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1978); Schultz v. Dain 
Corp., 568 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1978); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912 (8th 
Cir. 1976). Although this approach is clearly consistent with Howey when the manage- 
ment contract is cancellable upon short notice as in Faqo Partners, it seems open to 
question when the agreement is of longer duration, as in Schultz, because it then ap- 
pears the purchaser is relying on the efforts of another. In Schultz and in Commander's 
palan ~ & k  the court found-that the management arrangement was not offered by the 
seller, and that therefore the arrangement did not constitute a security under Howey. 
However, in Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 
(1981), the Fifth Circuit created a narrow exception to the general principle in a case 
involving participants in real estate joint ventures. The court recognized that an inves- 
tor may be incapable of exercising the control conferred upon him in an agreement. 
When the investor is "so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he 
is incapable of intelligently exercising his . . . venture powers . . ." 645 F.2d at 424, 
he is forced to depend upon the promoter and thus, he has purchased a security. The 
fact that the investor has-delegated management is not sufficient to find the presence of 
a security. Id. at 423. In Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1982), plaintiff, a 
substantial investor in five real estate syndications, sued the promoter and other defen- 
dants. Although the agreements gave the investors substantial control over the property, 
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held corporations, courts seem willing to extend it to purchases of stock 
in publicly traded corporations."' This is a logical extension of the doc- 
trine, considered by itself. However, because stock in publicly traded 
corporations is the quintessential security under the federal securities 
laws, anomalies in regulation may develop if this view is accepted. For 
example, a tender offeror may argue that his offer for a controlling 
block of a publicly traded corporation's stock is outside the scope of 
tender offer regulation, since he is not offering to purchase a security. 
While a court might avoid this untenable result by analysis of the rele- 
vant provisions of tender offer legi~lation,"~ this example illustrates the 
difficulties created by adopting .Forman's "economic realities" as the 
exclusive test for determining a security. 
111. ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR THE SALE OF BUSINESS DECISIONS 
Use of the sale of business doctrine to bar plaintiffs from asserting 
federal securities claims reflects several judicial concerns. First, many 
courts believe that the transactions in question are purely local in char- 
acter and impact, and that the cases therefore can more appropriately 
plaintiff argued that his dependency on the defendants brought him within the Wil- 
liamson v. Tucker exception. The court held that allegations that plaintiff depended 
upon the promoter's expertise precluded summary judgment for the defendant-pro- 
moter, but affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the other defen- 
dants. See also SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 
sub nom. Hecht v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 568 (1982). 
"' Zilker v. Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (N.D. Ill. 1981), states this explicitly. 
However, the statement is dictum because the stock in question was that of Bally Dis- 
tributing, then owned by three stockholders. Bally Distributing was purchased by 
Bally, a publicly held corporation. Cf. Alna Capital Assocs., Inc. v. Wagner, 532 F. 
Supp. 591, 602 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (court found "no need to apply" sale of business 
doctrine to sale of 38% of corporation's publicly traded stock). 
"' Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78n(d) (1976), regulates tender 
offers for, inter alia, equity securities which are registered pursuant to 12 of the 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Q 781 (1976). Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
78n(e) (1976), is a general antifra"d provision, modelled after Rule lob-5, which re- 
lates to all tender offers, and therefore to tender offers for all types of "securities." See 
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 596'(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. \ 873 (1974). A court confronted by the argument set forth in the text could find that the 
description of regulated securities in 14(d) is specific and unambiguous and therefore 
is not controlled by the general definition of a security found in Q 3(a)(10) of the Ex- 
change Act, IS U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976). While the coverage of § 14(e) was clearly 
intended to be broader than that of 14(d), the argument can be made that the general 
definition of security incorporating the sale of business exclusion is applicable in deter- 
mining the scope of $ 14(e) and therefore, a tender offer for a controlling block of stock 
is not a tender offer for purposes of 14(e). 
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be resolved in state courts.116 Second, plaintiffs have often failed to state 
federal securities claims adequately, leading courts to suspect that the 
sole motivation for alleging those claims is to create a jurisdictional 
predicate for bringing an action in federal court."' This fact, along 
with the Supreme Court's admonition not to federalize the law of cor- 
p~rations,"~ has led the courts to use the sale of business doctrine to 
dismiss the claims. Finally, courts may feel that these plaintiffs are in 
some sense "unworthy" because these cases necessarily involve negoti- 
ated transactions rather than impersonal market transactions. There- 
fore, the plaintiffs could have and should have bargained for - and in 
some cases did bargain for - whatever protection they needed.lI9 The 
sale of business doctrine, however, is unnecessary to rectify these con- 
cerns. To the extent these are appropriate concerns of the judiciary, 
rather than policy decisions properly left to Congress, there are estab- 
lished bases within Rule lob-5 case law. for excluding such claims. 
A. Failure to State a Federal Securities Claim 
Many of the decisions which rely on the sale of business doctrine to 
defeat the plaintiffs claims could reach the same result on other 
grounds. In Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc.,Iz0 the district court found 
that plaintiff failed to establish any of the material elements for recov- 
ery under federal or state securities laws or under common-law fraud 
rules.12' The Seventh Circuit nonetheless affirmed dismissal of the se- 
curities claims'22 solely on the basis of Frederiksen v. Polo way,Iz3 which 
it had decided a few months earlier. It also appears that many of the 
sale of business cases, had they gone to trial, would have resulted in 
findings that defendants did not violate Rule lob-5, either because they 
did not make material misstatements or omissions,'24 or because they 
lab See notes 131-41 and accompanying text infra. 
la' See notes 142-52 and ammpanying text infra. 
11' Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); see note 10 supra. 
See notes 153-64 and accompanying text infra. 
Iz0 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981). 
Iz1 The findings of the district court arc set forth, id. at 462. It specifically found no 
misrepresentations, lack of materiality, lack of reliance, no scienter, and no damage 
suffered. In addition it found that there was no sale of a security for purposes of federal 
and state securities laws. Id. at 462-63. 
lz2 The court of appeals also upheld dismissal of the common-law fraud claim, 
which involved the court's finding of no misrepresentation, scienter, reliance, causation 
or damages. Id. at 466. 
la' 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). 
If' See, e.g., Zilker v. Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070, 1074 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
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did not act with the requisite scienter.Izs Accordingly, in those instances 
it was unnecessary for the courts to use the sale of business doctrine. 
Similarly, to state a Rule lob-5 claim plaintiff must show that there 
was a purchase or sale'26 and, in most instances, that he was a pur- 
chaser or a ~eller . '~ '  In some of the sale of business cases, there was no 
purchase or sale, and that would have been a basis for dismissing those 
complaints. For example, in Reprosystem v. SCM Corp.,Im the grava- 
men of plaintiffs complaint was that, after negotiations for the 
purchase of defendant's foreign subsidiaries were concluded, defendant 
decided not to proceed with the sale. The court found no purchase or 
sale and thus no basis for invoking Rule 10b-5.'29 Other suits brought 
by disappointed would-be purchasers have been dismissable on the 
same  ground^."^ 
Iz5 See, e.g., Reprosystem v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
'16 See note 3 supra. 
12' Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1976), accepted the rule 
of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 
956 (1952), that one must be a purchaser o r  seller of a security to have standing to 
bring a Rule lob-5 claim. The status of certain exceptions to the Birnbaum rule, which 
had developed prior to Blue Chip Stamps, remains unresolved. The courts have, for 
instance, continued to apply the "forced seller" exception, which confers standing on an 
individual whose stock is involuntarily converted into a cash claim because of a merger 
or liquidation consummated through fraud. See, e.g., Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372 
(5th Cir. 1980); Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
430 U.S. 954 (1977); Morales v. Gould Investors Trust, 445 F. Supp. 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977), aiTd mem., 578 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally Gallagher, lob-5 After 
Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands theJudicial Oak?, 80 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1975); Jacobs, 
Standing to Sue Under Rule lob-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 387 
(1976). 
'?' 522 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
Id. at 1274. Compare Omega Executive Servs., Inc. v. Grant, [I979 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) fi 96,848 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1979); Desser v. Ash- 
ton, 408 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), a f fd  mem., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977), 
with Southeastern Waste Treatment, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 
944 (N.D. Ga. 1980). These cases explore the scope of another exception to the Birn- 
baum rule, see note 127 supra, when one has a contractual right to purchase securities. 
"O See Rollo v. Glynn, [Current Developments] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) fi 98,650 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1982); Bula v. Mansfield, (1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REP. (CCH) 1 96,964 (D. Colo. May 13, 1977); see also Somogyi v. Butler, 518 F. 
Supp. 970 (D.N.J. 1981) (plaintiff, purchaser of business' assets, alleged it was parties' 
understanding that he would organize corporation to receive assets and issue stock to 
him; court held that even if transaction constituted a purchase or sale, it was not "in 
connection with" the sale of a security). 
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B. Local Transactions 
Some courts have made it clear that they do not believe the transac- 
tion is a federal concern.13' This is not a new issue in Rule lob-5 liti- 
gation. In the past, defendants persistently and unsuccessfully argued 
that transactions involving close corporations, in which face-to-face ne- 
gotiations were conducted, lacked the requisite connection with inter- 
state commerce to invoke federal jurisdict i~n. '~~ It was early established 
that an  interstate telephone call was a sufficient use of an instrumental- 
ity of interstate commerce to invoke federal securities jurisdiction.I3' It 
appears now to be settled law that an intrastate telephone call over 
lines which run interstate is sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction.I3' 
See, e.g., Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952, 955 n.4, 956 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1981) 
(finding letter and phone call within state was insufficient to meet the jurisdictional 
requirement). 
832 Section 10 of the Exchange Act requires the use "of any means or instrumentality 
of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities ex- 
change." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), set forth in note 3 supra. 
'I3 See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 
365 U.S. 870 (1961). 
"' The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have expressly so held. Du- 
puy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1975); Aquionin Acceptance Corp. v. Kollar, 
503 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Spilker v. Shayne Laboratories, Inc., 520 F.2d 523 (9th 
Cir. 1975); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974). But see Barsy v. 
Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952, 955 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
Courts looked first at the explicit language of 5 10 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
78j (1976), set forth in note 3 supra, that is, instrumentality of interstate commerce, as 
contrasted with the language of 5 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 77e (1976), that is, 
instrumentality in interstate commerce. Dupuy, 511 F.2d at 642-43. Second, they de- 
termined that it was consistent with the legislative purpose to find a broad scope to 
federal securities regulation: 
[It] seems somewhat anomalous to assume, in the absence of express indi- 
cation of such an intent, that on the one hand, Congress and the S.E.C. 
meant to erect a comprehensive statutory scheme for the prevention of se- 
curities fraud, and on the other, intended to narrowly circumscribe its 
scope of operation. 
Id. at 643; "The bark of the Acts would be without substantially effective bite if we 
construed 'instrumentality of interstate commerce' in the narrow and highly technical 
fashion that the defendants urge." Spilker, 520 F.2d at 525-26. Moreover, this conclu- 
sion appears inescapable after the 1975 amendment to the Exchange Act's definition of 
"interstate commerce" which added the following sentence: "The term ["interstate com- 
merce"] also includes intrastate use of (A) any facility of a national securities exchange 
or of a telephone or other interstate means of communication, or (B) any other inter- 
state instrumentality." § 3(a)(17) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1976); 
see S. REP. NO. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 149, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
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Furthermore, the mails are an independent basis for establishing juris- 
diction. Therefore, a letter delivered through the mails, even if within 
the same state, will suffice.135 In addition, courts have consistently held 
that the misrepresentation or omission need not have been conveyed 
through the instrumentality of interstate commerce or by the mails. It is 
sufficient if the telephone call or the letter was "connected to"'36 or was 
"important"'" to the complained-of ~cherne."~ 
Nevertheless, in reading the sale of business cases, one senses a great 
deal of discomfort with this previously well-settled law.'39 Many of the 
cases do involve very "local" deals, and some courts clearly feel that the 
outer limits of Rule lob-5 jurisdiction have been exceeded.140 This feel- 
ing is intensified when the lob-5 claims are given only cursory treat- 
ment by plaintiffs attorney14' and appear to be only an excuse to get 
into federal court. Indeed, one lesson of these cases may be that if 
plaintiffs attorney does not take his own federal claim seriously, 
neither will the courts. 
C. Inadequate Presentation of Federal Securities Claim 
Under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the cir- 
cumstances constituting an alleged fraudw2 must be plead with specific- 
AD. NEWS 179, 268. 
'I5 See, e.g., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 Ft2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965); Harrison v. 
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 435 F. Supp. 281, 284 (W.D. Mich. 1977); Reube v. 
Pharmacodynamics, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 900, 912 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Levin v. Marder, 
343 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (W.D. Pa. 1972). 
Spilker v. Shayne Laboratories, Inc., 520 F.2d 523, 526 (9th Cir. 1975). 
13' Gower v. Cohn, 643F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981). 
"' Indeed, it apparently suffices if the stock is paid for by check which clears 
through interstate banking facilities. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), 
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). 
E.g., Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952, 955 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Bula v. Mans- 
field, (1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) fl 96,964 (D. Colo. May 13, 
1977). In contrast, the court in Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925, 931 (E.D. 
Pa. 1976), noted in rejecting the sale of business doctrine that "it is well-settled that 
section 10(b) applies to face to face transactions between private individuals and outside : 
the organized securities markets." I 
"O E.g., Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952, 955 n.4 (N.D. 111. 1981). ! 
"I  Id. at 956 n.7. 
"' In Ernst & Ernst v. Hahfelder, 125 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court made I 
it clear that scienter was required to establish a violation of Rule lob-5. Accordingly, 
plaintiff must set out sufficient facts in his complaint to make a showing of scienter. ! 
See, e.g., Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 169 (10th Cir.), cert. I 
denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977). The circuit courts have consistently held that "reckless ! 
behavior" constitutes scienter for Rule lob-5 purposes. E.g., Huddleston v. Herman & 
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ity,"' or the complaint may be attacked by a motion to dismiss.'44 Rule 
10b-5 claims are a particular type of "fraud" and are su6ject to Rule 
9(b). Therefore, conclusory allegations that the defendant's conduct vio- 
lated Rule 10b-5 are insufficient."' This requirement eliminates frivo- 
lous s ~ i t s , " ~  protects defendant's reputation,"' and apprises a defendant 
of plaintiffs claim and of the acts constituting the alleged fraud.I4' 
Many plaintiffs apparently have failed to detail adequately the na- 
ture of the alleged fraudulent misstatements or omissions.149 This may, 
again, prompt the court to decide that the complaint is in actuality 
founded on a state law contract or corporate claim.I5O 
Moreover, the judiciary's mistrust of the bona fides of the federal 
claims is intensified when the substance of the complaint appears to be 
a traditional state law claim, such as corporate mismanagement, which 
the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green1" found not to 
be fraud for Rule 10b-5 purposes. When the 10b-5 claim arises in the 
context of a shareholders' derivative suit, courts have noted that the 
shareholder is in reality complaining not that a fraud or deception was 
perpetrated on the co rpo ra t i~n , ' ~~  but that the officers and directors of 
the corporation breached a fiduciary duty owed to the shareholders. 
D. The "Unworthy Plaintiff' 
One senses that in some of the sale of business doctrine cases the 
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 545 (5th Cir. 1981), afTd in part, rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 
1023 (6th Cir. 1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 
790, 792-93 (7th Cir. 1977). 
"' It is sufficient if plaintiff sets forth "averments describing the barebones of the 
fraudulent scheme" as well as allegations that defendant used the mails or other instru- 
ments of interstate commerce. Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1975). 
"' FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1971). 
Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607-08 (2d Cir. 1972). 
I" Id. 
I" Felton v. Walston & Co., 508 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1974). 
"' See, e.g., Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Kane v. Fischbach, [Current Developments] FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) 1 98,608, at 92,987 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
'" Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952, 956 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
Is' 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977). 
Is' See, e.g., Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp. 
885, 889-91 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Zilker v. Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070, 1074-75 n.6 (N.D. 
Ill. 1981). 
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judges simply do not believe that plaintiff should be entitled to recover 
under Rule lob-5. There is a tone of assumption of risk or even caveat 
emptor in these opinions. Thus, the opinions mention that plaintiff was 
an experienced businessman, or that he had access to corporate books 
or records.IS3 This approach is repugnant to the congressional purpose 
and inconsistent with settled precedent.I5' The doctrine of due diligence 
serves to weed out claims by plaintiffs whose conduct should render 
them ineligible to recover. Due diligence recognizes that Rule lob-5 
should not recompense plaintiffs who have completely failed to look 
after their own interests. 
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Dupuy v. D u p ~ y ' ~ ~  is the leading 
case in this area. The trial court entered judgment for defendant, not- 
withstanding the jury's verdict for the plaintiff, because in its view 
there was "no evidence from which a finder of fact might have inferred 
any diligence on the part of the plaintiff."Is6 Defendant had purchased 
a forty-seven percent interest in a corporation from plaintiff, his 
brother, at a bargain price, intentionally misrepresenting the corpora- 
tion's prospects. The Fifth Circuit held that the jury could properly 
find that plaintiff had not acted carelessly and that, despite his failure 
to investigate into the affairs of the corporation and his initiation of the 
negotiations, plaintiff did not sell his stock in reckless disregard of the 
corporation's prospects. The.court emphasized that plaintiff had been 
cut out of participation in the business by his brother, that he had re- 
peatedly discussed the corporation and the stock sale with his brother, 
and that his ability to investigate was diminished by his need to find 
new employment and by his ill health.15' 
Analyzing due diligence, the court first reaffirmed its earlier view 
that plaintiffs due diligence was an appropriate consideration in Rule 
lob-5 cases, and accordingly should be considered as a separate element 
"' See, e.g., Golden v.  Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1149 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard, J., 
dissenting). 
"' See notes 162-63 infra. 
"' 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977). In an earlier deci- 
sion, Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
trial court's finding of insufficient connection with interstate commerce. The trial court 
found that although the plaintiff and defendant lived in the same apartment complex 
and shared a patio, many of the negotiations were conducted over the telephone. Dupuy 
v. Dupuy, 375 F. Supp. 730,731 (E.D. La. 1974). See notes 133-38 and accompanying 
text supra. 
Dupuy V. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1008 (5th Cir.), nrt. denied, 434 U.S. 911 
(1977). 
Is' 551 F.2d at 1020-23. 
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of this claim.1s8 The court then determined that plaintiffs conduct be 
judged by a subjective standard to permit the fact finder to consider 
relevant factors such as plaintiffs position in the industry, sophistica- 
tion, and expertise in financial matters.ls9 The court, however, re-ex- 
amined the circuit's earlier rule, and determined that a finding of reck- 
lessness, and not negligence alone, would be required to bar plaintiff 
from recovering.160 
The court reasoned that, because the Supreme Court's decision in 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder16' required scienter to establish defen- 
dant's liability under Rule lob-5, it would be inappropriate to bar 
plaintiffs recovery merely because of conduct on his part amounting to 
no more than negligence. The court found further support for this posi- 
tion in general tort law principles: as between a defendant who acted 
wrongfully intentionally and a plaintiff who acted wrongfully negli- 
gently, the plaintiff should win. In addition, the court noted that since 
Hochfelder has dramatically reduced the scope of Rule lob-5 liability, 
the courts should not further do so by barring merely negligent plain- 
tiffs from recovery. Thus, the Dupuy standard focused on whether the 
plaintiff had "intentionally refused to investigate 'in disregard of a risk 
known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware 
of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would fol- 
low.' "162 The Dupuy recklessness standard for plaintiffs conduct has 
been accepted by all circuits that have considered the issue.16' 
15' The court stated: 
By considering independently whether the carelessness of a plaintiff 
should preclude his recovery, the Court promotes two policies. First, gen- 
eral principles of equity suggest that only those who have pursued their 
own interests with care and-good faith should qualify for the judicially 
created private lob-5 remedies. . . . Second, by requiring plaintiffs to in- 
vest carefully, the Court promotes the anti-fraud policies of the Acts and 
engenders stability in the markets. 
Id. at 1014. As the court noted, due diligence can also be viewed as an aspect of reli- 
ance, another element of a Rule lob-5 claim, in that reliance must be reasonable or 
justifiable. Id. at 1015; see text accompanying notes 174-84 infra. 
Is' Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 101-6 (5th Cir.), mt. denied, 434 U.S. 911 
(1977). 
Ib0 551 F.2d at 1017-20. 
16' 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see note 142 supra. 
16' Dupuy V. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 
(1977), &ting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 8 34, at 185 (4th ed. 
1971). 
, 
I" The Second Circuit has adopted the Dupuy reasoning, Mallis v.  Bankers Trust 
Co., 615 F.2d 68, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1980); the First Circuit has approved Dupuy's rea- 
soning, Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 559 n.21 (1st Cir. 1978); see also Sundstrand 
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In light of Dupuy and cases following it, two observations can be 
made about the sale of business cases. First, the due diligence standard 
is available and sufficient to eliminate truly unworthy plaintiffs. When 
there are arms-length negotiations for the sale of a close corporation, it 
is reasonable to suppose that the individuals will possess equal bargain- 
ing power, and that the purchaser will have access to corporate books 
and records. Therefore, if the plaintiff examines the records and discov- 
ers evidence of fraud, but ignores it, or if the plaintiff fails to review 
the corporate records, he lacks due diligence, and his Rule lob-5 claim 
should Second, plaintiffs whose claims survive Hochfelder's re- 
quirement of scienter and who can show that they acted with the due 
diligence required by Dupuy, can hardly be said to be unworthy. 
E. No Reliance or Causation 
Reliance and causation are two further required elements which also 
serve to reduce the scope of Rule 10b-5.'65 They are muddled concepts 
in Rule lob-5 litigation. The starting point for any discussion of these 
elements is the Supreme Court's opinion in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. 
United States.'66 Defendants in that case included two employees of the . 
transfer agent for a corporation which held 'the assets of the Ute Indian 
tribe available for distribution to mixed-blood members of the tribe. 
The defendants fostered a secondary market in the stock by buying it 
from the mixed-bloods and selling it to others. The Supreme Court 
held that the defendants' failure to disclose the higher prices available 
violated Rule lob-5, stating that: 
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to 
disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that 
is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a rea- 
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048-49 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
875 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 692-95 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
430 U.S. 955 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596-98 (3d Cir. 1976). 
16' But see Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 
U.S. 955 (1977) (although plaintiff was a sophisticated insider with access to company 
books, he relied on several intentional misrepresentations made by defendant about the 
financial conditions of the corporation). The likelihood of plaintiffs conduct being 
found to lack due diligence increases when there is no blood or close relationship be- 
tween the parties, as there was in both Dupuy and Holdsworth, which fosters a reli- 
ance reasonable under the circumstances. 
I b 5  "The element of reliance serves to restrict the potentially limitless thrust of Rule 
lob-5 to those situations in which there exists causation in fact between the defendant's 
act and the plaintiffs injury.'' Wilson v. Comtech Telecomm. Corp., 648 F.2d 88,'92 
(2d Cir. 1981). 
Ib6 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
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sonable investor might have considered them important in the making of 
this decision. . . . This obligation to disclose and this withholding of ma- 
terial fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact."' 
The significance of this language has been widely debated.'68 It ex- 
pressly applies only to nondiscl~sure '~~ cases, leaving open the role of 
reliance in cases involving affirmative misrepresentati~ns."~ In addition, 
the transactions in Affiliated Ute were face-to-face, leaving unanswered 
its application in open market transactions."' Affiliated Ute does not, 
"' Id. at 153-54. 
"' Campbell, Elements of Recovery Under Rule lob-5: Scienter, Reliance, and 
Plaintiffs Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S.C.L. REV. 653 (1975); Leech, De- 
velopments under Rule lob-5 and Section 16(b), 4 INST. ON SEC. REG. 375, 380 
(1973); Stoll, Reliance as an Element in lob-5 Actions, 53 OR. L. REV. 169 (1974); 
Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lob-5, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975). 
16' However, in negotiated transactions, as opposed to market transactions, there 
probably are few pure nondisclosure cases; more-&urately, defendants failed to make 
disclosures necessarv under the circumstances to make the communications not mislead- 
ing. The distinction between misrepresentations and omissions is not clear-cut. For ex- 
ample, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the failure to 
disclose that higher prices were available in the secondary market was also an implied 
misrepresentation that the offered price was fair. 
"O In Wilson v.  Comtech Telecomm. Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981), 
cases involving misrepresentations were distinguished from nondisclosure cases. With 
misrepresentations, reliance involves whether plaintiff believed what defendant said, 
and whether this belief caused plaintiff's action. Thus, plaintiff must prove the misrep- 
resentation was a "substantial factor" in his securities activities. See, e.g., Herzfeld v. 
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1976). In 
nondisclosure cases positive proof of reliance becomes difficult to show, and the issue 
really becomes materiality. Wilson, 648 F.2d at 92 n.6. 
"I See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
816 (1976); Ruder, Judicial Developments Under Rule lob-5: Standing, Scienter, Reli- 
ance, Materiality and Implied Rights of Action, 7 INST. ON SEC. REG. 303, 323-28 
(1976). In addition, a number of recent cases have accepted a theory of market reliance, 
or "fraud on the market," when plaintiff did not read the document containing the 
misrepresentations, but assertedly relied on the market to reflect accurately the value of 
the stock. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
446 U.S. 946 (1980). CL Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
103 S. Ct. 722 (1983) (failure to read prospectus does not bar lob-5 claim when alle- 
gation is that stock was unmarketable). S& geherally Anderson, Rule lob-5: Recent 
Developments, 12 INST. ON SEC. REG. 369, 383-386 (1981); Note, The Fraud-on-the 
Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982). 
In an opinion vacated by the Supreme Court because of mootness, the Second Circuit 
held that an investor who did not read an annual report containing the inaccurate 
statements, but made the purchase after reading a newspaper article, can recover under 
Rule lob-5 on the theory that the article on which she relied would have presented the 
company in a less favorable light had the annual report been accurate, -and that the 
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however, eliminate the element of reliance from Rule lob-5 cases. In- 
stead, its holding is limited to one of two propositions: either that the 
plaintiffs case should not be dismissed because of failure to introduce 
affirmative evidence of reliance,172 or that the defendant carries the bur- 
den of proving that plaintiff did not rely.I7' Analysis of these complex 
issues is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Courts apparently will bar recovery if the alleged omissions or mis- 
representations could not have affected plaintiffs decision to buy or sell 
the securities. The court may find that the plaintiff did not rely on any 
misrepresentation or omi~sion,'~' that the defendant's misrepresentation 
or omission did not cause the plaintiffs injury,'7s or that the omission 
or misrepresentation was not material to the plaintiffs investment deci- 
sion.lT6 When the transaction involves face-to-face negotiations f i r  the 
purchase of a controlling block of stock in a close corporation, these 
principles are available to deny recovery to plaintiffs who fully under- 
stood what they were doing.177 
misstatements affected the "integrity of the market." Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 
(2d Cir. 1981), vacated sub nom. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982). 
The Second Circuit, relying on Affiliated Ute, asserted that "[jlust as a material mis- 
representation or omission is presumed to affect the price of the stock, so it should be 
presumed to affect the information "heard on the stmt" which led [the investor] to 
make her losing investment." 663 F.2d at 368. 
17' See R. JENNlNGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1049 (5th ed. 1982). 
17' Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
425 U.S. 993 (1976). See Leech, note 168 supra, at 380. 
. 
17' Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974), art. denied, 
425 U.S. 993 (1976). 
491 F.2d at 410. 
17' Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 496 F.2d 832, 837 (3d Cir. 1974). 
17' The Seventh Circuit has stated: 
It is not unlikely that the principal cause of concern about the inmase 
in this type of litigation is an assumption that it will always be much 
easier to allege and. prove a lob-5 case than a common law fraud case. 
That assumption may not be warranted because it is not necessarily true 
that the strict standards of disclosure which appropriately apply to trans- 
actions in which there is a dramatic disparity in the parties' access to ma- 
terial information will automatically and totally apply to negotiated trans- 
actions in which the parties typically rely on contract warranties and pre- 
closing inspection or audits as a basis for the investment decision. A flex- 
ible statute which emphasizes the relevance of the context in which a 
transaction takes place should neither limit its protection to an arbitrarily 
defined class of purchasers and sellers, nor arbitrarily assume that every 
purchaser and every seller is entitled to precisely the same disclosure. 
Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 660 n.28 (7th Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). Although the Eason court rejected the buyer-seller 
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Thus, in Titan Group, Inc. v. F a g g e ~ ~ , " ~  plaintiff alleged that defen- 
dant made false and misleading statements and failed to disclose mate- 
rial facts in connection with negotiations leading to plaintiffs acquisi- 
tion of four companies owned by defendant. In affirming the district 
court's dismissal of the complaint, the Second Circuit noted that plain- 
tiffs decision to acquire the business was not based on two memoranda 
presented to the plaintiff in the discussions prior to the sale. Rather, 
plaintiff made the acquisition because the companies fitted into its ex- 
pansion plans. The district judge had found that "these broad consider- 
ations, rather than interstitial details of client lists or of immediate data 
processing capacity, sparked Titan's acquisition intere~t.""~ Further- 
more, the district court emphasized the relative position of the parties, 
the arms-length nature of the negotiations, and plaintiffs opportunities 
to examine and investigate defendant's companies. The Second Circuit 
added that defendant's omissions were not material, given the 
circumstances. Ia0. 
Similarly, in Pittsburgh Coke & Chemical Co. v. Bol10,'~' the Second 
Circuit affirmed a judgment for ihe defendant, who sold a controlling 
interest in an aircraft equipment corporation. The purchaser, an owner 
of a commercial airline and a sophisticated investor, had unrestricted 
access to the business data upon which it based its investment decision, 
and had made a detailed review of the company's operations. In addi- 
tion to finding no material misstatements or omissions, the district court 
found that the acquisition was motivated by long-range investment 
objectives and was based on plaintiffs own knowledge of the corpora- 
tion and of the airline business.'82 
requirement of Birnbaum, see note 127 supra, its reasoning is applicable here because 
it emphasized a flexible construction of the statute, in contrast to the arbitrary and 
automatic bar imposed on plaintiffs by use of the sale of business doctrine. 
"' 513 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975). 
513 F.2d at 238. 
"O Id. at 239; see also Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 420 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974) (plaintiffs, who sold their stock back to the corporate 
defendant, charged that defendant failed to disclose the stock's book value, which was 
substantially greater than the purchase price: "This information, however, was readily 
available to appellants who, although aware of its existence and availability, were sim- 
ply uninterested."). 
"I 560 F.2d 1089 (2d Cir. 1977). 
"' Id. at 1092. In Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977), the same court 
said: 
The securities laws were not enacted to protect sophisticated business- 
men from their own errors of judgment. Such investors must, if they wish 
to recover under federal law, investigate the information available to them 
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Cases thus illustrate that the elements of Rule lob-5 - reliance and 
causation, as well as materiality and due diligence - can be used flex- 
ibly by courts to assess the worthiness of each case. The plaintiffs busi- 
ness acumen and bargaining power, familiarity with the actual business 
operations, and access to financial records of the corporation, appropri- 
ately may be considered to determine whether plaintiff has established 
a Rule lob-5 claim. Hence, the "potentially limitless thrust of Rule 
10b-5"'83 is in practice confined to cases in which courts can comforta- 
bly conclude that defendant's misconduct actually caused plaintiff 
in j~ry . '~ '  
IV. SALE OF STOCK VERSUS ALE OF ASSETS 
The preceding discussion demonstrates that many cases which have 
been dismissed by the courts on sale of business grounds could more 
properly be decided on other grounds. The principal argument for 
adopting the sale of business doctrine, however, is that these sales of 
ongoing businesses only happen to take the form of the sale of the cor- 
poration's stock by its  shareholder^.'^^ Courts reason that the transfer of 
ownership of the business could also have been effected by a sale of the 
corporation's assets. Or, if the original owner or owners of the business 
with the care and prudence expected from people blessed with full access 
to information. 
Id. at 763. The discussion of reliance also relates to the due diligence issue, as the above 
quotation from H i d  illustrates, because the asserted reliance must be reasonable or 
justifiable. See text accompanying notes 150-59 supra. (Hirsch imposed a negligence 
standard on the plaintiff. In this regard it has been modified by Mallis v. Bankers 
Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1980), art. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981), which 
adopted the Dupuy recklessness standard; see note 163 supra.) 
On the other hand, the Bollo and Hi& approach was criticized by the Fifth Circuit 
in Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1973): 
We should always be wary of holding that a purchaser of securities, 
who deals with the corporate insider, could have found out omitted mate- 
rial facts by examining the corporate books or undertaking other extensive 
investigations. To do so is to allow the insider to present prospective pur- 
chasers with a mountain of information which they cannot possibly digest 
and excuse themselves from liability on the basis that they did not provide 
the right answers because they were not asked the right questions. 
Id. at 1208. 
"' Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234,239 (2d Cir.), ccrt. denied, 423 U.S. 
840 (1975). 
I" 513 F.2d at 238-39. 
"' For expressions of this view, see King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 346 (1 lth Cir. 
1982); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151-52 (7th Cir.), art. denied, 451 
U.S. 1017 (1981); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443, 444 (10th Cir. 1977). 
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had decided not to incorporate the business, but to conduct it in unin- 
corporated form as a sole proprietorship or partnership, the sale of the 
business presumably would not have triggered application of the federal 
securities 1 a ~ s . I ~ ~  The argument concludes that since the substance of 
the transaction is the same, availability of a federal claim should not 
turn on the fortuitous selection of the method of sale or the form of 
doing business.I8' 
This argument fails, however, because it ignores the significant dis- 
tinctions between sales of assets and sales of stock, and between corpo- 
rations and unincorporated forms of doing business. The distinctions 
are well recognized and relied upon by attorneys"' to determine the 
best methods of doing business and of transferring the business. 
In comparing sales of assets with sales of ~tock,"~ the following can 
l a b  Although the Second Circuit rejected the sale of business doctrine in Golden v. 
Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1982), the court did make this observation 
about the facts in Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979). 
An interest in a general partnership normally is not considered a security since, 
under partnership law, each partner has a legal right to a voice in the management and 
control of the business. See Hirsch v. du Pont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975), a p d ,  553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977). However, when the partnership agreement 
confers all management responsibility on certain partners, the interests of the nonman- 
aging partners may be considered securities. See Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 
898 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf: State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 647, 485 
P.2d 105, 108 (1971) ("The primary weakness of the Howey formula is that it has led 
courts to analyse investment projecti mechanically, based on a narrow concept of inves- 
tor .participation."). A limited partnership interest, on the other hand, is considered a 
security, since a limited partner does not have the right to exekise control. Hirsch,. 396 
F. Supp. at 1227-28. 
"' See cases cited in note 185 supra. For the contrary view, see Coffin v. Polishing 
Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979): 
When ordinary corporate stock is involved in a transaction, we likewise 
need not consider whether the parties could have structured their arrange- 
ment in some other form. The parties-in this case chose to implement their 
plan for joint ownership by means of a stock transfer rather than a part- 
nership agreement or a sale of assets. Having decided to deal in stock, they 
brought their transaction under the provisions of the federal securities 
statutes. 
Id. at 1204. 
"' E.g., Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678 
F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982); see note 202 infra. 
'" A third method of acquiring a corporation's business is by statutory merger. See 
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW. $8 901-907, 910 (McKinney Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, $8 251-253, 259-262 (1974). Apart from the corporate formalities required by 
the merger statutes and the merged corporation's loss of its separate corporate entity, 
the advantages and disadvantages of a merger are similar to those for a stock acquisi- 
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be noted. The principal advantage of an asset sale is that the purchaser 
can pick and choose which assets and which liabilities he wishes to 
acquire. In a sale of stock, on the other hand, he acquires all the assets 
of the corporation by operation of law, and, more significantly, all the 
liabilities, known and unknown.190 However extensive the purchaser's 
pre-acquisition investigation, he may never be sure of what he has until 
after he has it.I9' Thus, acquisition of all the stock is riskier than an 
asset transfer.'92 Indeed, one commentator has stated that sales of all 
the stock are "obvious instances of natural dependence by one party on 
the other. for information affecting value" and therefore are appropriate 
for application of Rule 10b-5.'93 
Other distinctions between the forms of transfer are of practical im- 
portance in determining how to structure the transaction. Because the 
sale of the stock effects the transfer of the entire business, it is a simpler 
transfer that requires only a transfer of ownership of the stock certifi- 
cates on the books of the c~rporation.'~' In contrast, the purchaser of 
the corporate assets may have to perfect his title by preparing and filing 
deeds for real property or by transferring title to automobiles and other 
personalty, and thus may be subject to payment of local transfer, sales, 
and recording taxes, hence making the transfer more time-consuming 
tion. For an example of an acquisition accomplished through a merger because a 20% 
shareholder resisted sale of his shares, see Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 
F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980). A merger triggers a right of appraisal for any dissenting 
shareholders. See W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD 
CORPORATIONS 4 8.2 (2d ed. 1981). 
I9O See A. CHOKA, BUYING, SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES 1-8 (3d ed. 1969); 
J. MCGAFFEY, BUYING, SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES 1-3 (4th ed. 1979); W. 
PAINTER, note 189 supra, $5 8.2-8.4; Darrell, The Use of Reorganization Techniques 
in Corporate Acquisitions, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1200-02 (1957). 
This problem is particularly acute with the acquisition of a small business, be- 
cause complete books and records may not have been kept and accounting statements 
may not have been audited. See 1 J. HERZ & C. BALLER, BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS 4 
1.203a (2d ed. 1981). 
19' There are, however, doctrines which make the purchasers of the assets of a corpo- 
ration liable either to the shareholders of the acquired corporation's business or to its 
creditors. W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, $4 8.2(d), 8.4. 
19' 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES 
FRAUD 4 4.6, at 81 (1981). 
In negotiating a stock purchase, attorneys for the buyers may seek protection for 
their client by obtaining representations, warranties, and indemnification from the 
seller. In addition, a poriion of the consideration received for the stock may be placed in 
escrow. J. MCGAFFEY, note 190 supra, at 2. Nevertheless, the seller's liability for the 
corporate debts is secondary. 
19' W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, 4 8.3. 
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and expensive.lp5 Moreover, if the corporation has valuable nonassigna- 
ble contracts or leases, acquisition by stock transfer will usually be pre- 
ferred.lg6 Purchasers and sellers also will have to consider tax conse- 
quences of stock versus asset  transaction^.'^' 
Similarly, doing business in the corporate or the noncorporate form 
can significantly affect the business.lp8 The most notable distinction be- 
tween corporations and unincorporated business entities is the availa- 
bility of limited liability for the corporate form.lp9 Other significant 
substantive distinctions include continuity of existence, centralized man- 
agement, transferability of interests, and tax liability.200 Still other dis- 
tinctions relate to formalities of doing business.201 
T h e  "incongruity" of having a Rule lob-5 remedy available only 
when the transaction is a stock transfer is thus no more incongruous 
than the distinction between stock acquisitions and asset acquisitions, or 
between corporate and noncorporate forms of business. The law will 
not be simplified by treating the transactions as the same for Rule 
lob-5 purposes by employing the sale of business doctrine.202 
IPS W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, $8 8.2, 8.4; Darrell, note 190 supra, at 1199-1200. 
W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, 8 8.3; Darrell, note 190 supra, at 1199. 
19' The acquisitions discussed herein will be taxable transactions under the Internal 
Revenue Code, since the purchaser is paying for the stock or assets with cash or prop- 
erty other than stock or securities. (If the purchaser were paying for the acquired prop  
erty with stock, the securities laws would be applicable notwithstanding the sale of 
business doctrine, Southeastern Waste Treatment v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 506 F. 
Supp. 944, 949 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1980), unless the exchange involved a controlling block 
of stock on each side.) For the distinctions between a taxable purchase and a tax-free 
reorganization, see B. BI'ITKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION F COR- 
PORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 7 14.04 at 14-12, 14-13 (4th ed. 1979). For an over- 
view of the tax treatment of asset and stock purchases, see W. PAINTER, note 189 
supra, 8 8.5 at 419-22. 
"' See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 20- 
22 (5th ed. 1980); W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, $8 1.1-1.5. 
Attorneys can be found liable for malpractice for failing to explore with their clients 
the relative advantages and disadvantages of the different forms of doing business. See 
Haynsworth, Competent Counseling of Small Business Clients, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
399, 443-44(1980). 
19' See A. FREY, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH & C. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CORPORATIONS 1 (2d ed. 1977); W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, 8 1.3. 
2" See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, note 197 supra, 1 1.07 at 1-25 to 1-28; W. CARY 
& M. EISENBERG, note 198 supra, at 21-23; W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, $8 1.3, 1.4. 
lo' See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, note 198 supra, at 26-38; W. PAINTER, note 189 
supra, 8 1.4 at 15-16. 
lo' Plaintiffs who have argued against the sale of business doctrine by claiming reli- 
ance on the protection afforded by coverage of the federal securities laws have not fared 
well. In Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678 F.2d 
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The legislative history of the Exchange Act reveals little about the 
congressional purpose or the intended scope of ~ect ibn 10(b).203 Con- 
gress was principally concerned with transactions in securities on the 
national securities exchanges and the over-the-counter markets.204 Nev- 
ertheless, the coverage of Section 10(b) explicitly includes securities not 
registered on a national securities exchange,*'' and thus it is apparent 
that Congress intended Section 10(b) to extend beyond the organized 
trading markets.206 Early judicial understanding207 was that Rule lob-5 
applied both to face-to-face transactions, and to stock in close corpora- 
1139 (2d Cir. 1982), the district judge said that the transaction had been negotiated by 
able, experienced counsel who presumably should have been aware of the sale of busi- 
ness doctrine. In Seagrave Corp. v. .Vista Resources, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 378, 383 
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 696 F.2d 227 (2d. Cir. 1982), the district court stated that "the 
expectations, subjective intentions and motivations of parties do not determine whether. 
the federal securities laws apply," thus contradicting the underlying rationale of the 
Forrnan economic realities test. 
'O' Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-204 (1976); 3 L. LOSS, SECURI- 
TIES REGULATION 1424 (2d ed. 1961). The legislative history of the Securities Act and 
Exchange Act is compiled in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 
AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF '1934 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar eds. 
1973). 
'O' The preamble of the Exchange Act states that its purpose is: "To provide for the 
regulation of securities exchange and of over-the-counter markets operating in inter- 
state and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair 
practices on such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes." Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881; see also 5 2 of the Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. 5 78b (1976). This fact has been noted by the Supreme Court in United Hous. 
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). See note 21 supra. 
'O' See text of 8 lob at note 3 supra. 
'Ob 3 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1466-67 (2d ed. 1961). Restricting 4 10(b) 
to the organized markets would be contrary to express congressional intent that the 
comparable antifraud provision in the Securities Act, 8 17(a), 15 U.S.C. 8 77(a) 
(1976), is applicable to securities issued in exempt transactions, including private offer- 
ings. 3 L. LOSS, supra, at 1466-67. 
lo' Many courts have used language expressing a broad purpose of the securities 
laws. For example. the Supreme Court has stated that 8 10(b) is not "limited to pre- 
serving the integrity of the securities markets," but "must be read flexibly, not techni- 
cally and restrictively.'' Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 
12 (1971). 
It has been said that "there is a strong federal interest, evidenced by the entire field 
of federal securities regulation, in ensuring a proper flow of information between par- 
ties to a securities transaction." Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 
646 (3d Cir. 1980). Since the Supreme Court decisions in Blue Chip, Hochfelder, and 
Santa Fe, see note 10 supra, the rules have changed, and quoting this language in 
future may amount only to a wistful retrospective. 
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t i on~ ,~O~  and the Supreme Court in 1971 confirmed this view.209 
The sale of business doctrine has not been applied so far as to re- 
verse completely this common understanding. Rather, within the class 
of negotiated transactions involving stock in close corporations,210 it has 
been used to exclude from federal securities regulation transactions 
which transfer control of the business. Emphasis on the element of con- 
trol enables courts to use the Howey investment contract test2" to ex- 
clude these transactions from coverage, but application of the Howey 
test in this context seems an overly artful way to dodge explicit con- 
frontations with what arguably may be the overbreadth of the securities 
laws as currently written and unders to~d .~ '~  It is not an appropriate 
response to such a perceived problem to adopt the sale of business doc- 
trine, a rule which by arbitrary means reduces the scope of federal se- 
curities legislation. Courts should be reluctant to invoke the sale of bus- 
iness doctrine to dismiss a complaint which specifically alleges an 
intentional fraud.2" 
Arguments can be made that federal regulation of negotiated transac- 
tions or transactions involving close corporations is inappr~pr ia te .~ '~  
Nevertheless, this determination is a fundamental issue of policy to be 
decided by Congress, not by the  court^.^'^ T o  the extent Congress has 
'On Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960); Fratt 
v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1953); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness 
Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 959-61 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Speed v. Transamerica 
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 830-31 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 
F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Additional cases may be found in 3 L. LOSS, 
SECURITIES REGULATION 1467-68 n.83 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULA- 
TION 3613 (1969). 
' 09  Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10-11 (1971). 
Superintendent was decided prior to the line of cases restricting the scope of Rule lob-5 
discussed in note 10 supra. 
"O In dictum, at least one court has said that the doctrine is applicable to stock in 
publicly traded corporations. See note 114 supra. 
" I  See text accompanying note 19 supra. 
2 ' 2  Golden v.  Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1146 (2d Cir. 1982). 
"' See, e.g., Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 868 (1979). The seventh Circuit indicated its approval of Coffin in Frederik- 
sen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). 
'I4 See Note, A New A p p m c h  to Rule lob-5: Distinguishing the Close Corpora- 
tion, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 733. 
"' But see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) 
("[Ilt would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the [SEC] in 
1942 foreordained the present state of the law . . . It is therefore proper that we con- 
sider, . . . policy considerations . . . ."). It should not be a sufficient objection that 
plaintiff has a state-law remedy, because 5 28(a) of the Exchange Act states that: "The 
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appeared to consider the question, it has opted for broad coverage by 
the securities 
It may be true that there are too many Rule lob-5 claims asserted on 
flimsy grounds, and that this is the fault of attorneys who include Rule 
lob-5 claims solely to bring an action in federal court, attorneys who 
have not taken seriously the message of Hochfelder and Santa Fe In- 
dustries, I~C.~"  Accordingly, the courts should.act vigorously to discour- 
age frivolous claims. First, claims that do not plead fraud with ade- 
quate specificity should be d i smi s~ed .~ '~  Second, courts should not 
hesitate to impose costs and counsel fees if Rule lob-5 claims have been 
raised f r ivolou~ly~ '~  or have been pursued after plaintiffs attorney 
should have realized there was no adequate foundation for them.220 
The sale of business doctrine would, to a significant degree, eliminate 
rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in addition to any and all other rights 
and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; . . . " 15 U.S.C. $ 78bb(a) (1976). 
But see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977) (in determining that a 
defeated tender offeror lacks standing to sue under 4 14(a) of the Exchange Act, the 
court noted the availability of a remedy under state common law). 
"' See text accompanying notes 205-09 supra. 
21' See note 10 supra. 
'" See text accompanying notes 142-52 supra. 
"' The courts have the power to impose fees when an action has been commenced 
"in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." See F.D. Rich Co. v. 
United States ex -1. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Nemeroff v. 
Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1980). For a finding of bad faith, "there must be 
'clear evidentel. that the claims are 'entirely without color and made for reasons of 
harassment or delay or for other improper purposes.'" Id. (emphasis in original). A 
claim is colorable if "a reasonable attorney could have concluded that facts supporting 
the claim might be established, not whether such facts actually had been established." 
Id. (emphasis in original). An attorney might escape a finding of bad faith, because 
establishing scienter would require ascertaining the facts and circumstances of the 
transaction and might necessitate a jury finding. However, a few egregious cases of bad 
faith by plaintiff's attorney could be eliminated at the pleading stage, or after discovery. 
22"ee, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Costs and fees may also be imposed when the court 
finds either "(a) . . . [the attorney's] conduct of the litigation was intentionally dilatory 
[or] (b) [that at some] point during the litigation and prior to dismissal, sufficient facts 
became available to [attorneys] to demonstrate that a failure to at that point withdraw 
the action necessarily amounted to bad faith.'? Id.; see Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 
339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980). On remand, in that case, the district court imposed counsel's 
fees on plaintiff's attorney in the amount of $76,000. NemeroK v. Abelson, 94 F.R.D. 
136 (S.D.N.Y. 1,982). Noting that plaintiff's attorney conducted only five depositions in 
a 13-month period, none of them of a party-defendant, and none of them advancing a 
theory for recovery, the court said that "once [the attorney] learned that needed facts to 
support the merits of plaintiffs claims had to be found without the anticipated [New 
York Stock Exchange] assistance, he was obligated to concentrate all efforts on finding 
a basis for continuing the case on the merits." Id. at 139. 
Heinonline - -  16 U . C .  Davis L. Rev. 373 1982-1983 
374 University of  California, Davis [Vol. 16:325 
Rule lob-5 remedies for fraud in face-to-face transactions involving 
stock in close corporations. Use of the doctrine in these contexts is un- 
necessary, since correct application of already established Rule lob-5 
principles will result in decisions adverse to those plaintiffs asserting 
unworthy  claim^.^" The doctrine is also inappropriate, because it is 
contrary to the apparent congressional intent in enacting the securities 
laws.z22 Finally, the doctrine is ineffective, because in many cases there 
will be issues of whether a security is involved that will require resolu- 
tion at There is no reason in law or policy that the jurisdic- 
tional scope of the securities statutes should be manipulated to deprive 
otherwise worthy plaintiffs of a federal forum and the protection those 
statutes afford. 
Thus, the sale of business doctrine, enunciated in Frederiksen v. 
Poloway and followed by an alarming number of federal courts, is an 
overly facile and improper method for the courts to limit private causes 
of action by purchasers of stock in closely held corporations. Judicial 
desires to discourage frivolous claims can be accomplished as effectively 
by correct application of existing Rule lob-5 doctrine. There is nothing 
in either the congressional intent behind the federal securities statutes, 
or in the case law interpreting those statutes, that warrants the use of 
the sale of business doctrine as a jurisdictional barrier between worthy 
plaintiffs and federal courts. 
22 '  See notes 116-84 and accompanying text supra. 
222 See notes 203-06 and accompanying text supra. 
2" See notes 84-115 and accompanying text supra. 
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